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ABSTRACT
A fundamental characteristic of wireless communications is in their broadcast nature,
which allows accessibility of information without placing restrictions on a user’s location.
However, the ease of accessibility also makes it vulnerable to eavesdropping. This dis-
sertation considers the security issues of spread spectrum systems and in this context, a
secure information transmission system compromised of two main parts is presented. The
ﬁrst component makes use of the principle of reciprocity in frequency-selective wireless
channels to derive a pair of keys for two legitimate parties. The proposed key generation
algorithm allows for two asynchronous transceivers to derive a pair of similar keys. More-
over, a unique augmentation - called strongest path cancellation (SPC) - is applied to the keys
and has been validated through simulation and real-world measurements to signiﬁcantly
boost the security level of the design. In the second part of the secure information transmis-
sion system, the concept of artiﬁcial noise is introduced to multicarrier spread spectrum
systems. The keys generated in the ﬁrst part of the protocol are used as spreading code
sequences for the spread spectrum system. Artiﬁcial noise is added to further enhance
the security of the communication setup. Two different attacks on the proposed security
system are evaluated. First, a passive adversary following the same steps as the legitimate
users to detect conﬁdential information is considered. The second attack studies a more
sophisticated adversary with signiﬁcant blind detection capabilities.
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The broadcast nature of wireless communications has made it possible to access in-
formation at unprecedented levels without restricting the user’s location. However, this
open communications environment also makes the medium more susceptible to malicious
adversaries. In this dissertation, we consider the security issues involved in spread spec-
trum (SS) wireless communication systems. Such systems are used in applications which
require resilience to harsh environments, resistance to channel fading through frequency
diversity, low probability of detection (LPD), and low probability of interception (LPI).
However, as with any wireless communication system, due to the broadcast nature of the
communication, a passive eavesdropper (Eve) within the range of broadcast can obtain the
transmitted signal between a pair of legitimate users (Alice and Bob) and, given a sufﬁcient
number of signal samples, may be able to identify the spreading sequence and recover the
transmitted information.
An interesting avenue of research in the ﬁeld of wireless security makes use of the time-
varying and random nature of the wireless channel. Depending on the application, the
wireless channel is either seen as a hindrance - particularly to broadcast communication
devices whose primary goal is maximizing data throughput - or as an intriguing source
of information suitable for many unique applications. Of particular interest to us in this
dissertation is the application of wireless channels to wireless security.
This chapter serves as an introduction for the dissertation by educating the reader on
the necessary background material required for understanding this work. We start with
fundamentals on physical-layer security and give an overview of the different avenues of
research within this ﬁeld. The proposed security solution in this dissertation makes use of
the reciprocal wireless channel and therefore, we devote a section of this chapter to it. The
application for the proposed solution is for spread spectrum systems and therefore, we
2devote a section to these types of systems. Next, as is common with most of the research
in this ﬁeld, we describe a model for the adversary. Following the adversary model, we
highlight the contributions of this dissertation and end the chapter by giving an outline of
this dissertation.
1.1 Fundamentals of Physical-Layer Security
In this section, a brief overview of physical-layer security is given. The discussion starts
with Shannon’s model of perfect secrecy, which is found to be a fairly restrictive solution.
Next, this model is extended into three different areas into which wireless security has
branched off. For the curious reader interested in this subject matter, we recommend the
works in [1–3] where the following discussion is more elaborated upon.
1.1.1 Shannon’s Perfect Secrecy
The foundation of information-theoretic security was laid out by Shannon in his classi-
cal work [4]. This work concluded that perfect secrecy is achievable when the size of the
secret key is at least as large as the secret message. To help give a detailed explanation of
the ﬁndings here, refer to Shannon’s model of secrecy in Fig. 1.1. The goal here is to have
Alice communicate a message error-free to Bob while a passive eavesdropper listens and
acquires no information about the secret message.
In Fig. 1.1, Alice encrypts the conﬁdential message M with a key K to form a code-
word X . The key K is known only to Alice and Bob and the encryption and decryption
algorithms are known to Eve. Once the message is obtained by Bob, he decrypts it with K
to get M. The key, codeword, and message are now treated as random variables so that
information theory can be applied.
The entropy of the message is given by H(M) and the equivocation-rate is deﬁned as
H(M|X ). Deﬁnitions of entropy, conditional entropy, and mutual information for any
given random variables x and y are respectively given as
H(X) = ∑
x∈X














Figure 1.1. Shannon secrecy model
where p(x) is the probability distribution of X and p(x, y) is joint distribution of X and Y.
The equivocation-rate H(M|X ) describes Eve’s uncertainty in M reduced by knowl-
edge of codeword X . A coding scheme achieves perfect secrecy if knowledge of X does not
reduce uncertainty of message M - i.e., when the equivocation-rate is equal to the entropy
of the message, so that
H(M|X ) = H(M) (1.4)
which is equivalent to the information leaked to Eve being zero
I(M;X ) = 0 (1.5)
In other words, perfect secrecy states that given the codeword X , nothing will be
revealed about the conﬁdential message M by codeword X . This result provides a quan-
titative measure of security that is based on three strict assumptions -
• Computationally unbounded adversary - The model does not deﬁne any computational
constraint on Eve. Perfect secrecy essentially implies Eve has no way to guess the
message M given X .
• Key exchange - The only advantage that Alice and Bob have over the adversary in
Shannon’s model is in the key K that they share. The key is independent of the mes-
sage M. It must somehow be obtained by Alice and Bob through some procedure
whilst remaining unknown to Eve.
• Noiseless communication - The two receivers of Bob and Eve both obtain the same
transmitted codeword X without any error.
4A scheme which is known to obtain this form of secrecy is the one-time pad. The
one-time pad solution requires that the entropy of the key must be at least as large as the
entropy of the message - i.e., for every message bit, it is necessary to use at least 1 secret
bit or more.
The results of [4] is considered a ground-breaking achievement in the ﬁeld of security.
However, the result here is generally considered to be a pessimistic one since it requires
a signiﬁcant (if not impossible to achieve) key-distribtion algorithm that can generate the
keys needed to achieve perfect secrecy. In the next set of sections, we show how relaxing
the assumptions in Shannon’s perfect secrecy model can allow for varying degrees of
success in allowing two legitimate parties to communicate securely over the presence of a
passive eavesdropper.
1.1.2 Cryptographic Solutions
The most ubiquitous solution for security in wireless networks relies on cryptography-
based schemes that heavily utilize the application layer to provide security to the legit-
imate parties. Cryptographic protocols relax Shannon’s assumption of a computationally
unbounded adversary.
The system model remains largely the same as Shannon’s original model and is shown
in Fig. 1.2. Communication is still assumed to be error-free for all nodes. The most signiﬁ-
cant change here is that the key - known in these methods as a session key - is much shorter
than the message length [5]. The session key is called as such to indicate that it is period-
ically generated using one of the many public key cryptography (PKC) protocols, which
include the well-known Difﬁe-Hellman [6] key exchange and the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
(RSA) cryptosystem [7]. In PKC, session keys are generated through the help of trapdoor
one-way functions - mathematical functions which are computationally difﬁcult to compute
without a special code - the code being provided to the legitimate users by a certiﬁcate
authority. PKC-based methods require a lower bound assumption on the computational
power of the adversary. Additionally, they are computationally expensive - hindering the
application in mobile devices with limited battery power. Despite these shortcomings,
cryptography-based solutions have proven to be very effective in security applications







Figure 1.2. Cryptography model
to physical-layer-based counterparts and 2) the computational bounds of computers that
have been mostly limited relative to the technology of today’s cryptographic techniques.
Given the success and advancements of this ﬁeld, we note that the solutions presented
in this dissertation are not to be look at strictly as replacements to cryptography-based
methods. Rather, the physical-layer security methods discussed in this dissertation serve
as ameans of enhancing current wireless security. More speciﬁcally, in this dissertation, we
look to enhance security of wireless communication based on spread spectrum technology.
1.1.3 Physical-Layer Key Generation
Another set of solutions to the wireless security problem are physical-layer key generation
methods. A good set of surveys in this area can be found in [2, 8–10]. Here, the assumption
from Shannon’s perfect secrecy model where the adversary has no bounds on computa-
tional power is kept intact. Instead, researchers look to solve the key exchange problem in
Shannon’s perfect model. The main concept here is to generate a secret key between Alice
and Bob by making use of the following properties of the wireless fading channel:
• Channel reciprocity - The wireless channel between any two tranceivers using the
same wireless link experiences the same fading properties (gains, phase shifts, and
multipath delays).
• Channel randomness - Channel fading across time and frequency beneﬁts from ran-
domness due to Doppler spread and multipath delay spread, respectively.
• Channel independence over space - An adversary located more than a few wave-
lengths away from the legitimate users experiences another random and uncorre-
6lated channel [11].
The utilization of the key itself is up to the designer and can be used either as a one-time
pad - effectively providing perfect secrecy - or a session key as part of a cryptographic
solution. Figure 1.3 shows the following steps described in [12] that physical-layer key
generationmethods obey : 1) randomness sharing, 2) information reconciliation, 3) privacy
ampliﬁcation, and 4) secure communication.
As depicted in Figure 1.3, in randomness sharing, the legitimate parties probe the recip-
rocal wireless channel between them. The ’randomness’ here refers to the channel state
information (CSI) and is referred to in Fig. 1.3 as X and X′ for Alice and Bob, respectively.
In information reconciliation, the two nodes communicate with one another to reconcile
the differences, or non-reciprocities, between their channel measurements. This step is
crucial in obtaining keys that agree completely with one another at a high percent. Privacy
ampliﬁcation is a process that maps the reconciled channel measurements to a key whose
maximum size depends on the randomness of the measurements. Any information which
was leaked through information reconciliation is removed. At the end of this step, Alice
and Bob respectively have the keys K and K′. The goal here is to develop a protocol
in which the keys are at least as large as the secret-key capacity of the channel [1]. The
secret-key capacity quantitatively deﬁnes the amount of randomness that can be extracted
from the channel in the form of a key. Finally, in secure communication, the parties transmit
messages using the key - either as a one-time pad to provide perfect secrecy or as a key for
standard encryption algorithms.
1.1.4 Secure Information Transmission
Shannon’s perfect secrecy model assumes that Bob and Eve retrieve exactly the same
message as the one that was transmitted. However, most practical communication sys-
tems have some degree of additive noise seen at a receiver. In this section, we discuss a
particular subclass of Shannon’s perfect secrecy model in which noise is added to Alice’s
transmitted sequence.
One of the earliest attempts to relax Shannon’s assumption on noiseless communication
was made by Wyner in his seminal report on the degraded wire-tap channel (DWTC) [13].
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Figure 1.3. Flowchart describing outline of the general physical-layer key generation
model.
8the legitimate parties, experiencing noise from the receiver channel and the eavesdropper
channel. Hence, the eavesdropper sees a degraded version of the signal obtained by Bob. It
was shown in this report that secrecy could be achieved in the DWTC model even without
a secret key due simply to the fact that the eavesdropper’s received signal is degraded
compared to the Bob’s. The report introduced the notion of secrecy capacity - deﬁned as the
maximum rate at which a transmitter can reliably communicate a conﬁdential message to
the intended receiver without an eavesdropper being able to decode it.
The DWTC studied by Wyner in [13] was later extended to the Gaussian WTC [14]. The
secrecy capacity found for the Gaussian WTC is a simpler, and therefore more appealing,




















where P/σ2η and P/σ2 are the respective signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the receivers of Bob
and Eve.
The secrecy capacity deﬁnition in (1.6) is simply the difference in capacity of the main
link and the wiretap link. Two main assumptions of these models should be noted at this
point. First, the secrecy capacity characterization discussed so far only guarantees secrecy
if the channel state information (CSI) of both the Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve links are perfectly
known to Alice. This is often referred to as the Full-CSI case. For practical situations in
which such knowledge is unavailable, the secrecy capacity cannot be calculated and thus
perfect secrecy is not guaranteed. Furthermore, in situations where the secrecy capacity is
undeﬁned due to lack of Full-CSI knowledge, encoding schemes that are used to ensure
perfect secrecy cannot be used. Second, it should also be noted that so far, this character-
ization requires Eve to be at a disadvantage compared to Bob - i.e., secrecy does not exist
if Eve’s SNR is greater than Bob’s SNR. Due in part to the stringent assumptions required
in these early models, research in this area remained largely stagnant until very recently
when the reciprocal wireless channel was introduced into Wyner’s model.
The secrecy capacity of wireless channels was analyzed in [12]. In this deﬁnition of














9Note that the factor of 12 is removed in (1.7). This is attributed to the use of complex-
valued signaling instead of real-valued signals use to obtain (1.6). Fig. 1.4 illustrates the
model of secure information transmission systems used in [12], a derivative of the original
Wyner DWTC.
In [12], it was shown that fading can play an important role in securing wireless com-
munications without a key. The ﬂuctuation in the receivers’ SNR values induced by fading
can be used to transmit conﬁdential information at opportunistic times when the eaves-
dropper’s instantaneous SNR falls below that of the legitimate receiver.
In practical situations where the eavesdropper’s CSI is unknown to Alice, outage-based
characterizations have been adopted. To this end, Barros and Rodrigues in [15] introduced
the outage probability of secrecy - deﬁned as the probability that the instantaneous secrecy
capacity in (1.6) is less than the target secrecy rate Rs, i.e.,
Pout(Rs) = P(Cs < Rs) (1.8)
Another deﬁnition, which we have found to be more practical, for the probability of
secrecy outage was given in [16]. The alternative deﬁnition of probability of secrecy outage
is given by
Pout(Rs) = P(RT − CE < Rs) (1.9)
where RT is the rate of the transmitted codeword and CE is the capacity of the eavesdrop-






. We also express CB similarly.
The difference between the two outage-based characterizations is the following. In
(1.8), it is implied that Alice chooses an encoding strategy to work optimally for the per-
fectly known instantaneous realization of the CSI between herself and Bob. On the other
hand, in (1.9), a target rate is chosen by Alice based on some limited information about the
channel between Alice and Bob. In this way, the target rate may be chosen smaller than the
main link channel capacity in order to meet a certain reliability constraint. Hence, using
(1.9), it is possible to ensure a certain level of reliability in the main link’s channel and
therefore, a secrecy outage occurs when the capacity of Eve’s channel is within a margin
of Rs of the target rate.
Works related to the secrecy capacity have recently been extended to different types of














Figure 1.4. Secure information transmission model - note that we use hB and hE to
represent the channels between Alice to Bob and Alice to Eve, respectively.
sion systems that make use of the fading channel were also presented in [21–23]. Arguably,
the ﬁrst scheme that proposed such a concept was [21]. Here, the the conﬁdential message
was encoded using the inverse phase of the CSI between Alice-Bob. When the signal is
transmitted, the CSI between Alice-Bob acts as a decryptor, allowing Bob to retrieve the
message. At the same time, the phase of the eavesdropper’s channel, being different from
the receiver’s channel, prevented Eve from decoding the conﬁdential information. The
work in [22] extended this idea to multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) communication
systems.
Most popular amongst the class of secure information transmission systems is the
study of multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) channel models. The concept for the
MIMO channel is that Alice has an advantage over the adversary in the form of available
number of transmit antennas. Perhaps the most inﬂuential piece of work in this area is that
of Goel et. al.[24, 25]. Here, it was shown that the advantage of having multiple transmit
antennas allows for Alice to generate artiﬁcial noise. The produced artiﬁcial noise lies in
the null-space of the Alice-Bob channel. At the legitimate receiver, the artiﬁcial noise is
removed by the channel while the adversary’s channel is degraded by this noise. The
main result of this paper showed the existence of a secrecy scheme in which it is possible
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to achieve a non-zero secrecy capacity even when Eve has a better channel than Bob and
when Alice does not know the Alice-Eve CSI. The artiﬁcial noise transmission strategy is
discussed in more detail in a later chapter in this dissertation. We will see that this strategy
can be useful, not only for MIMO systems, but for spread spectrum technology as well.
1.2 The Wireless Channel
The primary focus of this dissertation is the study of physical-layer security enhanced
by the utilization of the wireless channel. This section provides a sufﬁcient background
on wireless channels to educate the reader on forthcoming discussions in this work. For a
more thorough overview of this subject, the interested reader is referred to [26–28], from
where the overview in this section is mostly summarized.
In wireless communication applications, a transmitter sends a message to the intended
receiver using electromagnetic (EM) waves generated using radio frequency (RF) equip-
ment and broadcast through the transmitter’s antenna. A high-level view of such a com-
munication system is shown in Fig. 1.5. Once sent, the emitted EM waves propagate in
all directions (assuming a standard omnidirectional transmit antenna). Hence, the signal
does not reach the receiving antenna directly. Instead, the radio waves seen by the receiver
are composed of many copies of the transmitted signal with different gains, delays, and
phase-shifts. These multipath components constructively and destructively combine at the
receiver to cause fading and distortion of the transmitted information. Oftentimes in the
literature, fading is categorized in two main forms - large-scale and small-scale fading. As
implied by the name, large-scale fading applies to large-scale networks in which fading
is caused by the natural surroundings around the network. As an example, mountain-
ous terrains exhibit different large-scale fading characteristics compared to urban areas.
Moreover, within urban areas, communication networks surrounded with big buildings
have different fading traits compared to residential areas and so on. The work in this
dissertation will be predominantly associated with small-scale fading effects.
Small-scale fading is characterized by the combination of gains and delay shifts of
the many multipath components arriving at the receiver. The multipath channel can be
considered as having a ”bandwidth”, which is typically referred to as the coherence band-




Figure 1.5. Wireless channel multipath propagation, black arrows show scattering
which describes the dispersion characteristics of the gains and time shifts of the multipath
components of the channel. The multipath propagation between a pair of nodes is unique
to that node-pair and depends on the surrounding objects responsible for the reﬂecting,
scattering, and/or diffracting of the emitted EMwaves. A slight location shift (on the order
of a few wavelengths) by either the transmitter or receiver is sufﬁcient enough to result in
completely different fading characteristics (see Fig. 1.6). Furthermore, motion of the objects
surrounding the nodes also induces changes in multipath propagation. Hence, the motion
of the nodes (or motion surrounding the nodes) strongly inﬂuences small-scale fading. In
fact, this type of motion induces a shift in received-signal’s frequency - a phenomenon
which is commonly called the Doppler shift. Related to the Doppler shift is the coherence
time, which quantiﬁes how static the channel is.
In general, there are four main types of small-scale fading experienced by a radio
channels depending on the transmitted signal’s time period and bandwidth relative to the
coherence time and bandwidth of the channel. These four characterizations are shown in
Fig. 1.7. When transmitting a narrowband signal - i.e., the bandwidth of the signal is much
smaller than that of the channel - the fading across the signal’s bandwidth will be largely
correlated (i.e., ﬂat) across the band. On the other hand, for frequency selective channels,
the transmit signal bandwidth is large relative to the coherence bandwidth and thus the
channel amplitude varies across the frequency domain. Slow and fast fading channels
refer to the time-varying nature of the channel relative to the transmitted symbol period.
The type of small-scale fading considered in this dissertation is the frequency selective,
block-fading channel model. The block-fading aspect here refers to the assumption that the
channel is static over a ”block” duration, after which time the channel may change. More-
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Figure 1.6. Example channel estimate from our experiment to show how a slight change in
receiver position introduces different small-scale fading effects. In this example, a channel
estimate was taken at location 1 and then the receiver node was moved by ∼ 1 meter

























Figure 1.7. Illustration of different types of fading experienced by a signal as a function of
transmit signal bandwidth and transmit symbol period. The boundary lines for coherence
time and coherence bandwidth should be interpreted as soft boundaries.
over, the transmit sequence has a wide bandwidth relative to the coherence bandwidth
and therefore, the channel is considered as frequency selective. These types of channels
are often modeled as linear, time varying ﬁlters. The time-varying nature is caused by
motion in the environment whereas the ﬁltering nature of the channel is an artifact of
the complex gains and time shifts of the multipath propagation. Due to the block-fading
model assumption, the channel is assumed to be time invariant over a block duration and
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therefore, we may simply represent the channel impulse response as
c(nTs) = ∑
i∈M
αi p(nTs − τi) (1.10)
where M = {0, 1, . . . , M − 1} and M is the number of multipath components. The sam-
pling period is denoted by Ts. The parameters αi and τi are the complex gain and delay
associated with the ith path and p(t) is the combined responses of the transmit and receive
ﬁlters. In this dissertation, we call p(t) the probing pulse, because of obvious reasons that
will become clear as we proceed.
In most real environments, any two different multipath components within the channel
impulse response are uncorrelated with one another. In other words α1 and α2 are uncor-
related since the two gains are caused by different scatters. In the literature, this type of
channel model is considered as having uncorrelated scattering (US) [27]. Furthermore, we
call multipaths resolvable if the time difference between any two multipath delays is larger
than the inverse bandwidth of the probing pulse. In a later section, we will discuss the
simulation model that we use for the channel impulse response in (1.10).
In this dissertation, we are largely interested in the physical-layer security application
of the wireless channel. Due to the channel reciprocity property, we use (1.10) to represent
the reciprocal channel between two pairs of legitimate users (Alice and Bob). For any other
user located more than a few wavelengths away from the legitimate parties (i.e., Eve), the
channel is represented by
c′(t) = ∑
i∈M′
α′i p(t− τ′i ). (1.11)
Considering channel independence over space, the channel parameters in (1.10) and (1.11)
are assumed to be independent of each other.
1.3 Multicarrier Spread Spectrum
In this section, we provide a brief background on multicarrier spread spectrum (MC-
SS) technology since the secure information transmission system proposed in this dis-
sertation is built around MC-SS-based systems. However, we should point out that the
proposed secure communication idea can also be trivially adopted into competing SS
systems such as direct-sequence SS (DS-SS), frequency-hopping SS (FH-SS), etc. Having
said that, the extension of our design to other SS approaches is deemed outside the scope
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of this dissertation. The following literature on MC-SS systems is recommended for the
interested reader [29–31].
MC-SS, like its DS-SS and FH-SS counterparts, is merely a subclass of SS systems.
The basic concept of SS communication systems is to spread a relatively narrow band
transmit signal across a wide bandwidth. The spreading procedures allows for SS sys-
tems to achieve a processing gain - deﬁned as the ratio of signal-to-noise ratio after and
before despreading. The manner in which spreading is accomplished differs between SS
technologies. For example, the main difference between DS-SS and MC-SS is that in DS-SS,
the spreading is applied in the time domain while in MC-SS, the frequency domain is used.
There are many applications for which SS is useful. Examples are - anti-jamming,
low probability of detection (LPD), low probability of interception (LPI), multiple-access,
resilience to frequency selective channel fading, etc. [30]. MC-SS systems in particular
have been shown to be resilient to partial and narrowband interference [31–33].
A block diagram of the transmitter for the MC-SS system is shown in Fig. 1.8. Here, the
illustration shows that a data symbol is multiplied by the set of spreading gain sequences -
{γ0, γ1, . . . γN−1}. Following the multicarrier modulator block, each data symbol is spread
across multiple subbands in the frequency domain. The subbands are sufﬁciently narrow
band, and since fading on each narrow band subcarrier can be considered to be relatively
ﬂat, a simple one-tap equalizer can be utilized, thereby signiﬁcantly reducing complexity
of the design.
1.3.1 Filter Bank Multicarrier Spread Spectrum
A particular form of MC-SS, developed by our research group is called ﬁlter bank MC-
SS (FB-MC-SS); see [29, 34–36] for more detail. Fig. 1.9 shows a simple diagram of the
transmitter-receiver pair for the FB-MC-SS system.







where s[n] is the n-th transmitted symbol, hk(t) are a set of non-overlapping ﬁlters, T is
symbol interval, and γk are a set of spreading gains. The ﬁlters hk(t) all originate from the






























































Figure 1.9. Simpliﬁed block diagram of FB-MC-SS transmitter and receiver
hk(t) = h(t)ej2π fkt (1.13)
where fk are the centers of the subcarrier bands. In FB-MC-SS, as introduced in [34], fk =
4π/T and h(t) is a square-root raised-cosine ﬁlter with the roll-off factor α = 1. With
these choices, the set of ﬁlters hk(t) are mutually exclusive in their pass/transition bands.
Moreover, the processing gain achieved in this spread spectrum system is found to be 2N,
where N is the number of active bands, [34].
At the receiver, the data symbols s[n] are recovered by linearly combining the the
outputs of an analysis ﬁlter bank in which the subcarrier ﬁlters are matched to hk(t), for
k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1.
The advantage of the FB-MC-SS technique over other MC-SS-based waveforms is that
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the use of non-overlapping ﬁlters do not leak across to other subbands. Hence, partial
or narroband interference is limited only to the affected subcarriers. In [29], experimen-
tal evidence of the FB-MC-SS system outperforming the DS-SS system in an interference
environment was shown.
1.3.2 Security in Spread Spectrum
As of today, the security in SS has been limited mostly to their spreading sequence. It
is often simply stated that a SS message signal transmitted by Alice cannot be recovered
without the right spreading code. However, very little has been said on true security of the
SS systems and most security solutions in the implementations of SS are limited. In fact,
surveys in [37] and [38] conﬁrm that research in this area is open.
Real-world implementations of SS systems, e.g., IS-95 and IS-2000 standards [39], have
used long-periodic psuedo-noise (PN) sequences in combination with a mask for physical-
layer security. The mask is shared between the mobile and base station, while the long-
code PN sequence is deﬁned by a 42-bit linear feedback shift register with a publicly known
characteristic polynomial. Despite the long period of the PN sequence, it has been shown
that an adversary with reasonable computational resources can implement a brute force
attack in as little as 2.2 seconds [37]. Li et al. [40] showed that an adversary with knowl-
edge of the characteristic polynomial need only intercept 42 continuous long-code PN
sequence bits to regenerate the entire long-code sequence. A solution proposed in [40]
uses a combination of cryptography and physical-layer techniques to aid in scrambling the
long PN sequence. However, the security of this method is reliant on the assumption of
a computationally bounded adversary and is limited by secrecy of the encryption session
key, assumed to be known a-priori in [40] between Alice and Bob.
1.4 Adversary Model
For the remainder of this dissertation, we will use the following model to characterize
the adversary in our secure communication setup. We assume Eve is a passive eaves-
dropper and she can estimate the channel between herself and the legitimate parties. Eve
performs the same steps as Alice and Bob in order to obtain her own key to detect the
communicated data transmitted by Alice. Eve can be near the legitimate users (i.e., in our
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experiments, her antenna is placed 1/3 meter away from Bob), but she cannot be in the
exact same location as Alice or Bob. Eve does not transmit channel probes and our current
security solution does not authenticate the nodes. Eve does not jam the parties during
channel probing, nor does she modify the transmitted messages before they are received
by a legitimate party. Moreover, it is assumed a sufﬁciently clean channel is available
between Alice and Bob so that they can obtain reciprocal estimates.
1.5 Dissertation Contributions
This dissertation describes the development of a wireless security solution for SS sys-
tems, though the focus is kept on MC-SS for the simplicity it offers. A side contribution
of this dissertation which has resulted in an evolution of the implementation of the FB-
MC-SS system in [34] was reported in [35] and [41] - the latter of which was awarded a
Best Demonstration Award in 2012’s IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum
Access Networks (DYSPAN).
Themain contribution of this dissertation is in the design of a robust secure information
transmission solution for spread spectrum communication. The system has two main
parts. First, we use the reciprocal wireless channel to derive a pair of keys shared between
two legitimate users. Next, the key is used as an integral part of our proposed secure
information system.
The key generation algorithm that we propose allows for two asynchronous users to
obtain a key using the estimated channel impulse response (CIR). A signiﬁcant problem
for keys generated using CIR estimates - for which we have identiﬁed and contributed
a solution to - is the time and phase misalignment between Alice and Bob’s obtained
CIRs. Related to this matter, we also contribute an augmentation - called strongest path
cancellation (SPC) - to the key generation protocol.
For the second part of the secure communication system, we introduce the concept of
artiﬁcial noise to spread spectrum systems. For this system, a unique artiﬁcial noise power
allocation strategy is proposed which ensures a level of high reliability for the main link.
Finally, we study a blind-detection attack on the secure information transmission system
and such attacks, when limited to the use of the second order moments of the received
signal, can be avoided.
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A preliminary version of this system resulted in [42] and was awarded a travel grant
by the MILCOM conference in 2015. An update to this paper - entitled Fault Tolerant Key
Generation and Secure Spread Spectrum Communication - has been submitted to IEEE Wireless
Transactions and is pending review.
1.6 Structure of Dissertation
The organization of this dissertation largely follows the block diagram of the proposed
secure information transmission system shown in Fig. 1.10. For the ﬁrst step, Alice trans-
mits a beacon signal to Bob who detects and transmits a beacon back to Alice. This step
is called channel probing and the implementation details of this protocol are highlighted
in Chapter 2. Following channel probing, the topic of channel estimation, key generation,
and other postprocessing steps are also discussed in Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 expands on time and phase synchronization and includes a study comparing
and contrasting different approaches that can be used to solve the problem. Furthermore,
the augmentation of Strongest Path Cancellation naturally follows in this section. The com-
bination of Chapters 2 and 3 completes the key generation portion of the dissertation - i.e.,
the ﬁrst two blocks in Fig 1.10. In Chapter 4, the last block in Fig 1.10 is described. In
this step, Alice encodes conﬁdential information symbols using her spreading codes (key)
and adds artiﬁcial noise prior to transmission. Bob applies his own spreading sequence to
the received data for detection of the information symbols and to remove artiﬁcial noise.








































Figure 1.10. Block diagram of secure information transmission system.
CHAPTER 2
SECURE KEY GENERATION
In this chapter, we detail the ﬁrst set of steps that will allow for two parties to engage
in reciprocal channel-based key exchange. This chapter will include a discussion about
channel probing, a thorough description of our channel estimator, as well as a channel
gain and delay estimator. Details about the simulation and experiment channel model are
also given. This chapter, as well as the entire dissertation, uses the terms spreading code
vector, key, spreading gains, and spread sequence interchangeably.
2.1 Related Work
In this dissertation, we will discuss the use of the properties of the wireless channel in
order to enhance the security level of the spreading gains in spread spectrum systems.
Application of the wireless channel in security applications is not new. In fact, there
have been many papers that discuss use of the salient features of the wireless channel to
enhance security in a wireless communication network. A good set of surveys in this area
are [2, 8–10]. There are papers that discuss physical-layer key generation, secure information
transmission, and those that discuss the aspect of theoretical security based on the bounds
of secrecy capacity.
In physical-layer key generation, researchers use the wireless channel to obtain a secret
key (see Fig. 1.3). In this line of work, research has focused on extracting a secret key
that must 1) be highly similar between Alice and Bob, 2) have high entropy, and 3) have a
high key generation rate. The secret key rate is highly dependent on the variations of the
channel as well as the degrees of freedom available in the estimate channel.
To increase variations in the channel, the concept of specialized electronically steerable
antennas to create artiﬁcial channel fading was introduced in [43]. This was later reinvesti-
gated in [44] from an information-theoretic standpoint. In short, special care must be taken
with these devices to ensure that the artiﬁcial fading induced by these antennas cannot be
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learned by the adversary.
Other methods to enhance the key generation rate in physical-layer key generation
techniques have been discussed as well. For example, user-mobility has been proposed
to enhance key generation rate [45]. In [46], it was shown through experimentation that
the received signal strength (RSS) from the multiple antennas available to MIMO radios
increases the degrees of freedom in a given estimate of the channel. In turn, this was
shown to increase key generation rate. Similar to the idea of using MIMO transceivers, the
work of Premnanth et al. [47–49] discusses the concept of increasing secret key generation
rates by using a MIMO-like system. A MIMO-like system, as opposed to a MIMO system,
is one in which multi-antenna capability comes from a collaboration of nodes each using
a single antenna, rather than from a single node equipped with multiple antennas. In
this collaborative system, one of Alice’s multiple set of nodes transmits a probe to Bob’s
MIMO-like set of nodes. All of Bob’s nodes record the measurement from one of Alice’s
nodes. The process is repeated across all of Alice’s nodes. Once all of Alice’s nodes have
had their turn, Bob repeats the procedure so that Alice’s nodes can obtain a reciprocal
estimate of the channel. Challenges - which are addressed in [47–49] - of such MIMO-like
systems arise from the signiﬁcant amount of time required by each set of users to probe
the channel that connects the two parties.
Another effort to enhance key generation rates was made by Wilson et al. [50], who
derives the mutual information of the wideband channel case. The authors of [50] show
that extracting keys from the multiple independent multipath components of the channel -
as opposed to using just the RSS - can signiﬁcantly boost the key generation rate. Another
interesting discussion in this report is the connection between bandwidth and secret-key
rate. Although the bandwidths analyzed in the report mostly apply to ultra-wideband
(UWB) radios, it was shown that increasing the bandwidth past a given point - depending
on the delay spread of the channel - provides diminishing returns. Theoretical maximum
key lengths of up to 150 bits at 30 dB for NLOS UWB type channels were shown to be
achievable in [50].
The secret key rate that was found in [50] was derived in the context of UWB channels.
Another approach was taken in [51] which considers channels of much narrower band-
width compared to UWB channels. The challenge of such ”non-UWB” channels is that the
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bandwidth may not be sufﬁcient enough to resolve the individual multipaths components
of the channel. In [51], Ye et al. derive an upper bound to the maximum key length that can
be extracted by Alice and Bob from i.i.d observations of the channel. When multipaths are
not resolvable due to bandwidth constraints, the maximum achievable key rate is less than
the derived upper bound.
The theoretically derived expressions for the key rates in [50] and [51] only consider
randomness of the complex gains of multipath fading channel. Following this assumption,
both reports propose that the upper bound of the achievable key rate can be obtainedwhen
a statistical model of each individual multipath components is available. In this context,
the power delay proﬁle of a given channel model can be plugged into the equations in
[50] and [51] to ﬁnd an upper bound for achievable key rates in UWB and non-UWB
channels, respectively. One important piece of information about the wireless channel that
we believe can possibly increase achievable key rates are the time-delays of the channel.
Through intuition from our experiments, we’ve found that the time-delays of each of the
individual multipath components of the channel can possibly contribute to increasing the
randomness of the keys derived frommultipath fading channels. However, the derivations
of this result are not within the scope of this dissertation because in this dissertation, we are
interested in developing a secure information transmission solution for SS systems rather
than a physical-layer key generation system.
Complementary to the research of [50] is the work of Liu et al. [52] which shows
that key extraction based on the entire channel state information (CSI) achieves superior
key rate performance than RSS-based methods that are most commonly used. It should
be noted that although increased diversity in CSI estimates is useful in terms of the key
generation rate, it is more complex to implement the CSI-based key generation techniques
due to the fact that RSS information is readily available in standard radios.
Many works within the physical-layer key generation scope have reported implemen-
tions and issues therein of RSS-based key generation [49, 53–56]. RSS is a popular statistic
of the radio channel because of its availability in most off-the-shelf wireless cards. It
can easily be measured without any modiﬁcation on a per frame basis. In one of the
pioneering literature pieces on the implementation of RSS-based key generation, Mathur
et al. [53] report two successful implementations of secret key sharing using off-the-shelf
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802.11a devices. The two implementations make use of RSS and CIR information of the
channel to achieve a key rate of approximately 1 bit per second. Premnath et al. [49]
examine key generation using RSS information available in 802.11-based laptops. In [49],
the authors examine key generation in different types of indoor environments where the
environment are characterized by the variations in the channel. By building upon the work
of [53], [49] proposes an environment-adaptive secret key generation technique which
adapts according to RSS variation. Implementation of this architecture was validated in
802.11-based laptops. In a later piece by the same author, the key generation method
discussed in [49] was used in evaluating secret key generation using Bluetooth radios [54].
The work of Croft et al. [55] was among the ﬁrst to validate the practicality of high-rate
RSS-based physical-layer key generation. Implemented on TelosB wireless sensors, key
generation rates of up to 22 bits per second with approximately 4% probability of bit
disagreement were reported using the proposed HRUBE key generation method. This
paper was then extended to a method called ARUBE [56]. Here, rates of up to 40 bits
per second with the same 4% probability of bit disagreement were obtained using TelosB
wireless sensors. Implementation issues that are brought up in [55, 56] and solved accord-
ingly are: 1) mismatch due to fractional timing offset between Alice and Bob, 2) trade-off
of high key generation rate versus low probability of bit disagreement, and 3) temporal
correlation in channel measurements. The issue of temporal correlation is discussed in
other works as well [57–59], though with different solutions. In particular, the study in
[58] has looked into the temporal correlation in UWB channels due to slow fading. In [58],
a linear channel prediction algorithm was proposed to remove predictable estimations.
Similarly, the proposed idea can be used as a decision mechanism through which Alice
and Bob can decide when to probe the channel. A related study in [59] has looked into
sampling the wideband channel at a percentage of the coherence time intervals and issues
thereof. It was suggested in this report that often using 50% coherence time sampling may
be insufﬁcient to ensure randomness of the key in slow fading channels.
Another group’s [60, 61] work in this area is in the validation of properties of the wire-
less channel for ultra-wideband measurements. Of particular interest in their work is that
they are one of the few to consider the similarity between Bob and Eve’s measured channel.
One of their ﬁndings is that using the envelope of the channel measurements yields high
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cross-correlation between Bob and Eve’s channel vector - suggesting the possibility of
successful passive attacks.
In summary of our discussion of PHY-layer key generation, we note that these sets of
methods focus on obtaining pairs of keys which are identical to one another- e.g., the keys
are by design fault-intolerant. This criterion requires for both nodes to either 1) engage in a
lengthy period of measurements so that channel noise can be averaged out to a sufﬁciently
low level or 2) repeat multiple iterations of information reconciliation to compensate for
non-reciprocities in the channel measurements. This signiﬁcantly slows the throughput of
the key generation system. Additionally, many in the ﬁeld do not consider the signiﬁcant
communication cost [62] of information reconciliation. This cost is due to the fact that the infor-
mation passed between legitimate parties must be communicated error free which requires
proper digital modulation that includes overhead due to synchronization, forward-error
correction, channel training and equalization, MAC information, etc.
In the context of our work for SS security, we note that the processing gain of SS systems
allows some tolerance of mismatch of spreading codes used by the two communicating
parties. Thus, SS provides an interesting opportunity to implement a secret key-based
communication system that is fault tolerant to a mismatch of the keys generated by Alice
and Bob if the key is used as a set of spreading codes for SS.
2.2 Channel Probing
Suppose now that we have the following problem. Two sets of authenticated users
(Alice and Bob) wish to communicate across a wideband channel securely with a multi-
carrier spread spectrum (MC-SS) technique. To do so, the parties need to somehow set up
identical, or near identical, spreading code vectors in the presence of a knowledgeable
adversary (Eve) who knows the protocols through which the legitimate parties set up
spreading codes. If Eve can somehow obtain the same spreading code that Alice and Bob
are using, then we deem the security of this system to be compromised.
We make use of the reciprocal wireless channel to set up these spreading codes so
that codes are highly correlated for two users on opposite ends of the same link while
statistically uncorrelated for any adversary located in a different position from Alice and
Bob.
26
The ﬁrst step in this endeavor is referred to as channel probing. The concept itself
is fairly simple - Alice transmits some beacon signal to Bob so that he can estimate the
channel connecting the two users. Bob, upon hearing Alice’s beacon, follows up by trans-
mitting a beacon back to Alice for her own channel estimation purposes. The channel
that is probed must be estimated at the same frequencies for both links. Thus, to avoid
interfering with one another, they must resort to a time-division duplex (TDD) method.
The diagram in Fig. 2.1 shows this simple procedure. Ideally, the probe should be
sampled at coherence time intervals, so that the same frequency-selective channel is not
estimated over and over again. In practice, however, channel probing is not quite as
simple. Real-world scenarios include cases in which Alice or Bob do not hear one another,
synchronization between the two is off, the users need gain adjustment in their received
signals, etc. Thus, special care must be taken in practical channel probing algorithms.
Fig. 2.2 depicts a state machine of the channel probing that we have implemented. It is a
more complex variant of the mechanism depicted in Fig. 2.1.
The channel probing protocol depicted in Fig. 2.2 starts with a crucial Synchronization
Stage used to control the digital and analog gains depending on the received signal data.
In this way, if two nodes are placed too close to one another, the gains are adjusted so that
clipping of the received signal does not occur. The opposite situation is also conﬁgured so
that when nodes are too far away from one another, gains are adjusted so that quantiﬁca-
tion noise does not signiﬁcantly impact the received signal. The synchronization stage is
completed when the two parties have obtained P packets. If at any point, should the two
nodes timeout due to not receiving an acknowledge packet from the other node, the two
nodes adjust their gains and restart the Synchronization stage all over again.
At the end of this stage, Alice and Bob both obtain the average power in their received
data and use it to control the digital and analog gains. Note that the power is averaged over
many packets to minimize errors due to channel noise. As long as there is little difference
in the radio frequency (RF) hardware between the two nodes, the gains conﬁgured of
Alice and Bob will be roughly the same. Note that the gains conﬁgured at the end of
the Synchronization Stage are not reconﬁgured in the Channel Probing Stage. This is to
make sure that either Alice or Bob do not reconﬁgure these parameters as it introduces
a non-reciprocity in the channel estimates that is software-based.
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Figure 2.1. High-level description of the channel probing method.
In the Channel Probing Stage, Alice acts as the master and Bob as the slave. Each
state starts a timer which will be used to dictate when a timeout has occurred. After the
Synchronization Stage ends, Alice’s transmits a beacon to Bob. If Bob acknowledges that
the beacon has been received, he sends a beacon back to Alice and the timer is reset. Once
Alice receives a beacon back from Bob, she resets her timer as well and the two nodes start
again after a channel coherence time period. If at any point should either of the two nodes
timeout, both nodes will remain silent and proceed back to the Synchronization Stage since
the digital gains need to be updated.
Note that the channel coherence time period is itself a fuzzy quantity. It should ideally
be known a-priori. However, the true nature of the channel is difﬁcult to describe statis-
tically as it depends on the environment in which the two nodes are communicating. If
the two nodes are sitting in a static environment for example, the channel coherence time
is indeﬁnite and thus, the estimates of this static channel would generate the same key.
In our implementation, we have set the probing system so that measurements are made
once every second and that movement around one of the nodes ensures enough channel
variation in time so that the same key is not generated over and over again. Note that the
key generation discussed in this dissertation uses channel frequency selectivity as a source
of obtaining randomness as opposed to time variation of the channel.
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State 1: Alice   Bob
Transmit beacon to Bob
State 1: Bob  Alice
Wait for beacon. 
Timeout after T seconds
Start
State 2: Bob   Alice




Packet RX’d Timeout 
State 2: Alice  Bob
Wait for beacon. 










Exit synchronization stage 
after P packets
State 1: Alice   Bob
Transmit beacon to Bob
State 1: Bob  Alice
Wait for beacon. 
Timeout after T seconds
Starts when previous state ends
State 2: Bob   Alice
Transmit beacon to Bob




Packet RX’d Timeout 
State 2: Alice  Bob
Wait for beacon. 
Timeout after T seconds










Exit when enough packets 
generated
Figure 2.2. State machine of the implemented channel probing protocol.
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2.3 Transmitter Design
The transmit sequence that we use is an N length Zadoff-Chu polyphase sequence
[63, 64]. The sequence is formally deﬁned for even values of N as
s[n mod N] = e(
jπn2
N ) . (2.1)
The Zadoff-Chu sequence has seen widespread use in LTE and UMTS systems [65]
due mostly to its special signal processing properties, most notably that it is orthogonal to




s[0] s[N − 1] s[N − 2] . . . s[1]
s[1] s[0] s[N − 1] . . . s[2]






s[N − 1] s[N − 2] s[N − 3] . . . s[0]
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (2.2)






SSH = IN . (2.3)
which shows that s[n mod N] is orthogonal to cyclic shifts. We will ﬁnd that this property
is useful for channel estimation.
A block diagram describing the transmitter is shown in Fig. 2.3. The transmit sequence
is appended with multiple copies of itself to allow for signal averaging at the receiver for
more precise channel estimation. In total, K repetitions of the transmit sequence form the
beacon signal - i.e., n = 0, 1, . . . NK − 1. It is then pulse-shaped with a square-root raised




s[n mod N]pT[t− nTb] . (2.4)
where Tb = TsL is the time interval between beacon symbols and Ts is the sampling
interval of the ADC. The output x(t) in (2.4) is up-converted to the desired radio frequency
(RF) band and transmitted.
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L pT[n]
Beacon c(t)s[n mod N] 
Figure 2.3. Block diagram of channel probing transmitter
2.4 Channel Estimation
The received signal samples, after demodulation to baseband, are ﬁltered with pR(t) - a
ﬁlter matched to pT(t). Ignoring channel noise for the time being, this results in a received
signal that is periodic with NL and is equivalent to
y(t) =∑
n
s[n mod N]c(t− nTb) . (2.5)
The received data is sampled at discrete time intervals equally spaced at intervals of Ts.
Next, by decimating a period of y(t) by a factor of L, we obtain L signal vectors, each of
length N. We denote these vectors by {y| = 0, 1, · · · , L− 1}. These relate to L decimated
samples of the impulse response of the equivalent baseband channel, c(t), according to the
equations
y = Sc (2.6)
where
y = [y(Ts) y (Ts + Tb) . . . y (Ts + (M− 1)Tb)]T (2.7)
c = [c (Ts) c (Ts + Tb) . . . c (Ts + (N − 1)Tb)]T . (2.8)










where (2.10) follows from the fact that the transmit signal is orthogonal to cylic shifts (2.3).
Solutions to c (2.10) for  = 0, 1, · · · , L− 1, give a set of components of the channel im-
pulse response which can be interleaved to construct a channel impulse response vector of
length LN. This process which is performed by Alice, Bob, and Eve leads to the respective
CIR estimates that we denote by cA[n], cB[n], cE[n]. This channel estimation technique is
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advantageous in that it allows us to obtain the samples of CIR at a high resolution in time
with a relatively low complexity, [66]. This, as will be found later, will become instrumental
in development of an effective key generation algorithm.
2.4.1 Discussion of Channel Probing Parameters
The parameters associated with channel probing and estimation are L, N, and K which
respectively represent the oversampling factor, the length of the transmit sequence, and
the number of transmit sequences within a beacon. The discussion in this section details
how these parameters were chosen for our experiment.
The oversampling factor L is determined by the bandwidth given to us in practice.
In our case, following the implementation of the FB-MC-SS system in [35] to which the
work in this dissertation applies, the total given bandwidth is 32.5 MHz with a sampling
rate of T−1s = 130 MHz. Therefore, we use an oversampling factor of L = 4. Given that
the probing pulse is derived from a root-raised cosine ﬁlter with a roll-off factor of 12 , the
32.5 MHz bandwidth of the transmitted signal corresponds to the 3 dB bandwidth.
Next, the factor N should be chosen such that the maximum length of the channel
can be resolved by the transmit sequence. Otherwise, if the channel leaks across packets,
the time averaging of multiple transmit sequences will incoherently average the signal
resulting in signiﬁcant channel estimation error. For our measurement campaign, we
selected N = 128, though it was later found that all measured channels ﬁt well within
a temporal window corresponding to N = 64. Following channel estimation, the number
of samples in the truncated CIR estimate is equal to LN = 256, which gives the CIR a
duration of ∼ 2μs.
Finally, the value of K should ideally be set according to the expected channel coher-
ence time interval. A high value of K allows more time averaging in the received signal
and therefore reduces the effects of channel noise. Increasing K will expand the beacon
duration. If the beacon duration is such that the block fadingmodel is no longer applicable,
the time averaging process is not guaranteed to constructively average the received signal
and therefore, increasing K too much can also add signiﬁcant estimation error.
To determine a value of K, we need an expected value for the channel coherence time Tc
as well as the channel probing time duration - deﬁned as the time it takes for Alice to estimate
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Bob’s channel and vice versa, i.e., the time it takes for Alice to switch between transmitter
and receiver. To determine K, the total duration of Alice’s and Bob’s beacons plus the
channel probing time duration - denoted by Tp - should be set equal to the expected value
of Tc. In our implementation of the channel probing system, we successfully managed to
keep the channel probing time duration to a value ∼ 1 ms. The total time duration of the
transmitted signals of Alice and Bob is equal to (2 · K · LN)× Ts.
In our experiment, we set K = 30 and note that approximately 5 transmit sequences are
used for packet detection. This gives a beacon duration of ∼ 0.12 ms which means that so
long as the coherence time of the channel is greater than Tp ≈ 1.24 ms, the estimated CIR
should be sufﬁcient. It should be noted that this is approximately one order of magnitude
smaller than expected values of coherence time intervals in indoor environments (typically
a value in the order of 10 ms is used [59]). In retrospect, we note that the value of K could
have been set higher so that better channel estimation could have been accomplished.
However, a minor detail regarding our choice of K is as follows. The time-varying nature
of the channel is not exactly abrupt and the channel coherence time is a soft value. The CIR
may slowly vary from one estimate to another a coherence time period away. This slow
variation of the channel may increase error from the block-averaging procedure. In short,
setting K is not an exact science - a given K may work for one environment yet can be too
high for the very same environment at different periods of the day due to ﬂuctuation.
2.5 Channel Gain and Delay Estimation
Following channel estimation, the CIR path gains and delays are estimated for the
purpose of time and phase alignment which is discussed in the following chapter.
To start, Alice and Bob interpolate their respective CIRs cA[n] and cB[n] by a factor of
L2. This further increases the time resolution of the available samples. The remaining
steps are performed on these interpolated CIRs which we call c˜A[n] and c˜B[n] and assume
to be a good approximation to the respective continuous time functions. In the subsequent
discussions, we refer to the length of the interpolated CIRs c˜A[n] and c˜B[n] as Nc.
After interpolation, both nodes estimate the ”path candidates” in their respective CIRs.
Path candidates are considered to be a combination of estimated path gains and delays,
which for Alice are respectively denoted by α˜i,A and k˜i,A, for i = 0, 1, · · · , M− 1, and are
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similarly deﬁned for Bob. These parameters are determined by taking the following steps.
Here, we have removed the subscripts A and B for simplicity, but it should be understood
that the presented steps are applied to both c˜A[n] and c˜B[n].
Step 0: Initialize i = 0 and c˜i[n] = c˜[n].
Step 1: Let
[k˜i, α˜i] = argmin
k˜i ,α˜i
||c˜i[n]− α˜i p[n− k˜i]||2. (2.11)
Step 2: Remove path candidate i from the CIR by taking
c˜i+1[n] = c˜i[n]− α˜i p[n− k˜i] . (2.12)
Step 3: Increment i by one and repeat Step 1 and Step 2 until i = M.
The result of this step gives (α˜i,A, k˜i,A), (α˜i,B, k˜i,B), and (α˜i,E, k˜i,E) for Alice, Bob, and
Eve, respectively. It will be seen in the following chapter that this aids in the proper
synchronization of the time and phase offsets between Alice and Bob’s CIRs.
2.6 Key Generation
The channel gain and time delay estimates are used in time and phase synchronization.
At this time, we will move forward as if synchronization has been properly executed
according to the procedure in the subsequent chapter.
The ﬁnal step in obtaining a spreading code sequence from the reciprocal wireless
channel is outlined here. All parties follow the same procedure as Alice who ﬁrst takes






∣∣∣∣m ∈ [Passband of CA]
}
(2.13)
by Alice. Similarly, Bob and Eve respectively generate γB and γE.
At this point, we note that further processing can be applied to build an arguably
more secure key. For instance, in one particular idea reported in [41], the key is generated
according to the following steps.
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1. The vector ms which is obtained by a random shufﬂing of the elements of m is
generated
2. Deﬁne the phase vector Θ = ∠(CA(m)) +∠(CA(ms))
3. Construct the following vector as the key
γsA = e
jΘ (2.14)
This effectively gives a key that is the summation of the phase of the channel frequency
response with a shufﬂed version of the same signal. This key has a nice property which
further decorrelates Eve’s key from the legitimate users’. In a later section, wewill compare
keys against one another when they are used as part of the secure information transmission
system.
The key generation procedure discussed so far in this chapter is summarized in Fig. 2.4.
Once obtained, these sequences are used as an integral part of the secure information
transmission communication system.
2.7 Wireless Channel Models
To help in evaluating the various different ideas discussed in this dissertation, we
use both simulation and experimental channel data. The simulated channels follow a
standard approach that is prevalent in wireless communication research. The experimental
data set was obtained through a measurement campaign in environments in which we
expect the proposed design to work. The simulation model is given so that results can be
numerically conﬁrmed and evaluated while measurement data conﬁrms the practicality of
our proposed system. The details related to these two types of channels are discussed in
this section.
2.7.1 Simulation Model
The wireless channel simulation model considered in this dissertation is relatively sim-
ple. It should be noted that there is a signiﬁcant amount of research in the ﬁeld of wireless
channel modeling and that there are many channel models other than the one we use. For
















Figure 2.4. Block diagram of proposed key generation method in which spreading gains
are generated from the channel impulse response. Note that the time alignment and
strongest path cancellation blocks are discussed in the next chapter.
Themodel of thewireless channel that wewill make use of follows amultipath Rayleigh
fading channel model adopted by the IEEE 802.11Working Group for software simulations
[67]. A nice feature of this channel simulation model is that it only requires one parameter
to be deﬁned - the mean delay spread [27]. This is because the root mean square (rms)
delay spread and the mean delay spread are the same for the exponentially distributed
power delay proﬁle. The discrete-time exponential channel model is deﬁned as
Ac[k] = Ac[0]e−kTs/T¯m (2.15)
where
Ac[0] = 1− e−Ts/T¯m (2.16)
and T¯m is the mean delay spread parameter.
Due to uncorrelated scattering, the tap gains - αi - and delays - τi - of the channel ex-
pression in (1.10) are set in the following manner. The tap delays are uniformly sampled at
intervals of LTs. The complex-valued gain of each multipath component is Rayleigh faded.
However, we do note that the ﬁrst multipath component may at times follow a Rician
distribution to simulate a line-of-sight (LOS) multipath wireless channel, in accordance
with the IEEE 802.11 wirless channel report in [?].
2.7.2 Experimental Channel
In addition to a simulation model for the wireless channel, real-world results are also
obtained to conﬁrm satisfactory operation of the proposed system. We validate our meth-
ods with a transceiver based on the National Instruments (NI) platform. The transceiver
consists of an NI FlexRIO FPGA Module (NI PXIe-7975R). This module is connected to an
NI FlexRIO RF Transceiver (NI 5791R), which has a sampling rate of 130 MHz. The FPGA
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and transceiver module are both connected to an NI real-time controller (NI PXIe-1082),
which is used as a host PC and is programmed using NI LabVIEWReal-Time. The FlexRIO
RF Transceiver is connected to a circulator (Model No. CS-0.900) that is fed to an RF
ampliﬁer (NI PXI-5691) and then to a single antenna. All three parties in our experiment
(Alice, Bob, and Eve) use identical transceiver setups and Eve’s transmitter is turned off.
Experiments are run at a carrier frequency of 900 MHz.
Time-division duplexing is used for channel probing. The duration of each transmitted
packet, consisting of multiple repetitions of the ZC sequence, is 118¯s. A few extra ZC
sequences are prepended to the packet for packet detection purposes. The time duration
between the time it takes for Alice to measure Bob’s channel and vice versa is ∼ 1 ms.
Details of the experimental setup are illustrated in Fig. 2.5. In total, 6500 channel mea-
surements are captured. Prior to obtaining each measurement, the environment around
Alice is varied, either by moving Alice or having an experimenter move around the node
to ensure variation between measurements. In Fig. 2.5, the dashed lines show how Alice’s
location was varied across the map while the nodes of Bob and Eve are kept between one
of the two locations shown in the map. Data is collected from over-the-air measurements
and subsequently used to generate keys ofﬂine.
2.8 Conclusion
This chapter has described some of the preliminaries of the secure information trans-
mission system. In particular, the channel probing protocol used to obtain over-the-air
measurement data was detailed. Additionally, we described methodologies of our channel
estimation technique along with channel gain/delay estimation and key generation. The
simulation and experimentation channel that we use throughout this dissertation were
also detailed.
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Figure 2.5. Experimental setup on the third ﬂoor of Merrill Engineering Building at the
University of Utah. The position of Alice was varied across the dotted lines while Bob and
Eve remained stationary in one of the two displayed locations. Eve was synchronized to
Bob’s clock, while Alice and Bob operated on asynchronous clocks. The antenna of Bob
and Eve were placed approximately 1/3 meter apart.
CHAPTER 3
RECIPROCAL CHANNEL TIME/PHASE
ALIGNMENT AND STRONGEST PATH
CANCELLATION
The wireless channel is a viable candidate for security applications in wireless commu-
nications. This is due to the properties mentioned in Chapter 1 which can effectively allow
a pair of legitimate users (Alice and Bob) to share a secret - the secret being a realization
of the channel - that is statistically uncorrelated for a third party (Eve) located more than a
few wavelengths away from the main users.
To exploit thewireless channel as ameans for physical-layer security, two authenticated
users go through a channel probing process. Here, Alice transmits a beacon packet to Bob,
who upon hearing Alice, quickly transmits the same packet back to Bob (see Chapter 2 for
a more detailed description of the beaconing and channel estimation process).
Although the wireless channel between a pair of users at identical frequency and time
instants is reciprocal, bidirectional measurements of the channel are not. Among the non-
reciprocites which can degrade the similarity of the estimated channel between a pair of
users are:
• Additive channel noise.
• Interference arising from other active nodes within vicinity of the communicating
parties.
• Differences in hardware which can contribute to carrier frequency, phase, and IQ
offsets.
• Doppler shifts, which can contribute to a signiﬁcant amount of disagreement be-
tween Alice and Bob’s channel measurements if the channel probe time duration is
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longer than the channel coherence time - i.e., the channel is ﬂuctuating more quickly
than the time it takes for Alice and Bob to probe the channel.
• Time misalignment arising from the TDD (time-division duplexing) nature of the
channel beaconing protocol.
Given the above channel non-reciprocities, in this chapter, we will focus on the non-
reciprocities that can be controlled through signal processing. To this end, we note that
time and phase synchronization are the two most obvious non-reciprocities that can be
controlled and hence, we devote this chapter to the discussion of time/phase alignment.
3.1 Background
The work discussed in this chapter addresses practical issues in physical-layer security
applications which make use of the reciprocal radio channel. We consider the extraction
of a key using measurements the channel impulse response (CIR) - thus randomness in
the key comes from the frequency selectivity of the channel. When the reciprocal CIR is
considered, we’ve found that timing and phase offsets can contribute to a signiﬁcant source
of error between Alice and Bob’s channel measurements. The ﬁrst part of this chapter will
focus on time and phase alignment.
As a motivating example, we present Fig. 3.1 which shows one particular realization
from our experimental data set following channel estimation. It is quite easy to see from
this ﬁgure that despite the fact that the CIRs of Alice and Bob exhibit similar proﬁles, the
timing offset between the two users contributes to a large amount of dissimilarity in the
measurements.
It should be reemphasized that we do not assume Alice and Bob to be time or phase
synchronized. A number of researchers - particularly those evaluating simulation results
- assume there to be perfect synchronization between the nodes [50, 68]. Some researchers
working on obtaining real-world measurements use a cable to synchronize the clocks of
Alice and Bob [69, 70], while others use uni-directional measurements to approximate
bi-directional measurements [60]. Furthermore, in many reports - e.g., [45, 71, 72] - it is
unclear how exactly time and phase offsets are taken care of.
Contrary to these works, our solution adheres to the true nature of wireless communi-
cations - i.e., Alice and Bob are operating two asynchronous and disconnected transceiver
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Figure 3.1. Example plot of the magnitude of the channel following the channel estimation
step. Here, cA[n] and cB[n] represent the CIR estimate at Alice and Bob’s node, respectively.
nodes located a reasonable distance away from one another. Little has been said in the
literature about the synchronization problem addressed in this chapter. In fact, we’ve only
been able to ﬁnd the following research on this topic. Madiseh et al. in [73] discuss how
synchronization errors can lead to diminishing key rates, but do not present a solution.
In particular, it is interesting to see that there is a signiﬁcant drop in mutual information
between Alice and Bob’s received signals even when the time misalignment between the
two nodes is small. Croft et al. discuss the requirement of time and phase synchronizaton
in CIR measurements in [74]. Here, they propose a solution in which the CIRs of Alice
and Bob are time aligned according to the median value of the magnitude of the CIR.
Phase synchronization is accomplished by zero-forcing the angle of the sum of the CIR to
zero. In [51], an orthogonal greedy algorithm is utilized to seek the complex gain and time
delay of the different multipath component of the channel. However, it is unclear how the
authors handle the situation in which the time delays of one of the multipath components
of the CIR differs between the two nodes.
In light of the current state of the art, we aim to give both a thorough review of the
problem of timing and phase synchronization in reciprocal radio channel measurements
as well as compare a set of solutions. Later, we will see that our augmentation of strongest-
path cancellation (SPC) follows from these discussions.
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3.2 Channel Time/Phase Alignment Model
Following the channel estimation step, Alice and Bob both have their own discrete
sample estimates cA[n] and cB[n] which contain time and phase offsets with respect to one
another. We can represent cA[n] and cB[n] in equation form as
cA[n] = c(nTs − μA)ejφA + ηA[n] (3.1)
cB[n] = c(nTs − μB)ejφB + ηB[n] (3.2)
where μA and μB are time delays, φA and φB are phase errors, and ηA and ηB are noise terms
that arise from channel noise. The parameter c(nTs) represents the reciprocal wireless
channel, discretely sampled at time spacings of Ts. In this chapter, we will consider the




αi p(nTs − τi) (3.3)
where M = {0, 1, . . . , M− 1} and M is the number of paths. The parameters αi and τi are
the complex gain and delay associated with the ith path and p(t) is the combined responses
of the transmit and receive ﬁlters.
The parameters (μA, φA) and (μB, φB) are, in general, different between Alice and Bob
and hence, if uncompensated for, can lead to a signiﬁcant source of disagreement between
the two legitimate parties. In this chapter, the following three phenomena associated with
time and phase misalignment will be discussed - 1) integer time offset, 2) fractional time
offset, and 3) phase offset. A greater part of the discussion in this chapter will be devoted
to the integer time offset as our solution for adjusting the fractional time and phase offsets
simply follows from synchronization of the integer timing offset.
3.3 Time/Phase Alignment
Two different types of approaches can be taken with regards to time alignment. The
difference between these two approaches is that one set of methods assumes that a public,
insecure channel is available for Alice and Bob to feedback synchronization messages and
the other set of methods does not assume such a channel is available. Many physical-
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layer key generation protocols in the literature assume the availability of such a channel
[2, 8–10].
The trade-off in using a public channel versus not is that the use of such an outlet
will allow for Alice and Bob to agree on a reference with a very high percentage. On the
other hand, it incurs a signiﬁcant energy cost on the network since sophisticated digital
modulation techniques are required to ensure that data integrity is upheld. Additionally,
using a public channel for feedback opens the door for the adversary to use/abuse such
information to its advantage. Given the trade-offs, it makes sense to discuss our ﬁndings
for both types of approaches.
The following steps are taken prior to making a timing decision. First, we take the CIR
following the channel estimation step in Section 2.4 from (3.1) and (3.2) and proceed by
shifting the CIR of each estimate according to its strongest path to a predeﬁned location.
Next, Alice and Bob interpolate their respective CIRs cA[n] and cB[n] by a factor of L2, to
further increase the time resolution of the available samples to them. The remaining steps
are performed on these interpolated CIRs which we call c˜A[n] and c˜B[n] and assume to
be good approximations of the respective continuous time functions. In the subsequent
discussions, we refer to the length of the interpolated CIRs as Nc. Finally, path candidates
in their respective CIRs are calculated using the techniques discussed in Section 2.5. Once
path candidates (α˜i, k˜i) are calculated, the interpolated CIRs are time-shifted such that their
largest path gain falls to the middle point of respective sequences. Note that this requires
adjustment of the delay parameters k˜i.
After this set of steps, the respective nodes need to process the path candidates, use
them to make a timing decision, and proceed to apply that decision to the CIRs. A set of
methods to accomplish these tasks are discussed in the following sections. Once the timing
decision has been applied, the results are subsequently decimated L2 fold to obtain a pair
of channel estimates.
In upcoming discussions, we will take (α˜T, k˜T) to be the path candidate which Alice
and Bob use for time alignment and refer to this path candidate as the selected time path
candidate. Note that the subscripts A and B have been removed in the selected timing
point, but it should be understood that the steps presented in the following sections are
applied to both c˜A[n] and c˜B[n] and that the subscripts may be reintroduced for emphasis.
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Once a timing decision has been made - e.g., the selected time path candidate or time index
has been found - the CIRs of Alice and Bob are circularly shifted so that the time indices k˜T
(or nT) fall to a predeﬁned location.
3.3.1 Time/Phase Alignment With Feedback
A block diagram is provided in Fig. 3.2 to help illustrate the concept of the time align-
ment methods which use a public feedback channel to aid in synchronization. Here, Alice
acts as the leader and gives Bob information regarding her timing decision.
3.3.1.1 Mean Delay Reference
In this method, Alice time aligns according to her strongest path and then proceeds to
calculate the relative time difference between her estimate of the mean delay parameters
and the location of the strongest path. This information is fed back to Bob, who uses it to









is calculated at both Alice’s and Bob’s nodes.
Next, Alice calculates the relative time difference between her estimate of the instan-
taneous mean delay and the location of her strongest path - which had been time aligned
to the middle of the CIR. This results in a new delay parameter kD = Nc2 − k¯A. Alice
then transmits kD to Bob. Note that this transmission does not need to be secure as this
information has no value to Eve, whose channel has no similarity to Alice’s or Bob’s
channel. Upon receiving kD, Bob calculates the reference delay
kref = k¯B + kD (3.5)
At this point, kref should be a time location in Bob’s CIR near the strongest path of
Alice’s CIR. However, non-reciprocities in the CIR along with estimation error muddle the
location of Alice’s strongest path relative to Bob’s. To handle this problem, we propose
that Bob solves the equation
[k˜T,B, α˜T,B] = arg min
i∈[0,M−1]
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Figure 3.2. Block diagram of time synchronization with feedback
where pi[n] = α˜i,Bp[n − k˜i,B]. Note that (3.6) searches for the path candidate of Bob’s
channel which maximally correlates to p[n− kref]. The corresponding output k˜i,B in (3.6) is
then used as Bob’s reference point and is thus time aligned to the middle of the respective
sequence. This procedure ﬁnalizes the time alignment of c˜A[n] and c˜B[n].
3.3.2 Time/Phase Alignment Without Feedback
Fig. 3.3 shows a block diagram of the time alignment approach taken in this section.
Note that Alice and Bob follow the exact same steps as one another and that they develop
their own timing decision independent of one another. The methods discussed in this
section are more prone to error than the previous section. However, this time/phase align-
ment approach does not require Alice and Bob to communicate across a public channel
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Figure 3.3. Block diagram of time synchronization without feedback
and path candidate calculation is assumed to be done prior to the steps taken in this
section.
3.3.2.1 Fine Alignment
Fine alignment corresponds to time synchronization methods which choose one of the
M path candidates (α˜i, k˜i) as the decision. A number of ﬁne time alignment methods based
on a thresholding approach are described in this section. The ﬁrst path candidate (ﬁrst in
terms of temporal location) which passes a given threshold is taken to be the selected path
candidate. In other words, the selected path candidate (α˜T, k˜T) is the smallest k˜i whichmeets
the condition |α˜i| ≥ δf. The following procedures highlight different ways we obtain δf:
1. Max-based Threshold - In this approach, the ﬁrst strongest path of the channel is
determined as the time alignment point and δf is a value that is some percentage
of the dominant path, i.e.,
δf = βmax · |α˜max| (3.7)
where βmax is a percentage value between 0 and 1. Note that when βmax = 1, this
method simpliﬁes to simply choosing the most dominant path.
2. Percentile-based Threshold - The parameter δf can also be based on the βperc percentile
of the channel gain. The βperc percentile is the value below which (100× βperc)% of
the channel gain data are found. As an example, the median value of the channel
gains - α˜i for i = 0, 1, . . . , M− 1 - corresponds to the 50th percentile (i.e., βperc = 0.5).
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Note that the median value of the channel was proposed as a time alignment point
in [74].
The percentile can be computed by ﬁrst sorting all M values of |α˜i| in ascending
order. The result of this sorting operation gives α˜s, so that |α˜s0| ≤ |α˜s1| ≤ . . . |α˜sM−1|.






and the following threshold δf is obtained from the ordinal rank as follows
δf = |α˜sι | (3.9)
3.4 Strongest Path Cancellation
Once c˜A[n] and c˜B[n] are time aligned, they are circularly shifted so that the determined
time alignment point will be located at the time index n = 0. The results are subsequently
decimated L2 fold to obtain a pair of channel estimates of length NL. Lastly, the channel
estimates are phase aligned by introducing a phase shift to the elements of each CIR such
that the path located at time index n = 0 has phase of zero. We call the ﬁnal time and
phase aligned CIRs cˆA[n] and cˆB[n].
Now that the timing and phase offsets have been resolved, let us consider the passive
adversary, Eve, who follows the exact same synchronization steps as Alice for her own
estimated CIR to obtain cˆE[n]. At this stage, assume that the time and phase alignment
method described in Section 3.3.1.1 - in which Bob time aligns according to the strongest
path of Alice’s estimated CIR - is used. Without getting into the detail, we note that by
following Alice’s time alignment steps, Eve can better synchronize with the legitimate
users than she could by following Bob’s alignment procedure.
For simplicity, we ignore the channel noise term and thus, note that the ﬁnal CIR
estimates for Alice and Eve can be expressed as
cˆA[n] = |α˜sp,A|p[nL2] + ∑
i∈M\sp
α˜i,Ap[nL2 − k˜i,A] (3.10)
cˆE[n] = |α˜sp,E|p[nL2] + ∑
i∈M′\sp
α˜i,Ep[nL2 − k˜i,E] (3.11)
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where α˜sp,A and α˜sp,E are the gains of the strongest paths of Alice and Eve’s channels
respectively. Additionally, M\sp and M′\sp contains the set of all paths excluding the
strongest path for Alice and Eve, respectively.
Next, we deﬁne the length NL CIR vectors cˆA = {cˆA[n]}, cˆB = {cˆB[n]}, and cˆE =
{cˆE[n]}. Also, we let p = {p[n]}. Given (3.10) and (3.11), the partial correlation between
Alice and Eve’s CIR estimates can be expressed as
AE =
cˆHA cˆE
‖cˆA‖ ‖cˆE‖ . (3.12)
Evaluation of (3.12) using (3.10) and (3.11) gives





is a positive and relatively large term arising from the time and phase synchronized strongest
paths of Alice and Eve, and \sp,AE is the residual partial correlation arising from the re-
maining paths. Since these remaining paths are not synchronized, their partial correlations
are usually a set of zero-mean, low variance random variables that add up to a statistically
small value. This observation leads us to the following proposal.
Tominimize the similarity of the keys generated by Alice and Bobwith the key that Eve
generates, Alice of Bob should remove the strongest paths of their respective synchronized
CIR estimates and use the residual responses to set the keys. We call this method strongest
path cancellation (SPC) and use c¯A[n], c¯B[n], and c¯E[n] to denote the residual CIRs for Alice,
Bob, and Eve, respectively. For instance, Alice’s CIR after removal of strongest path is
obtained as
c¯A[n] = cˆA[n]− |α˜sp,A|p[nL2] (3.15)
and similar equations are used to obtain the residual CIRs of Bob and Eve.
Our assumption here, which has been validated through an extensive set of 32.5 MHz
wide indoor wireless channel measurements, has conﬁrmed that the residual CIRs have
sufﬁcient information to assure highly correlated keys for Alice and Bob, while leading to
a dissimilar key for Eve.
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3.5 Results
In this section, we ﬁrst compare the various time/phase alignment procedures dis-
cussed thus far. The discussion naturally leads to strongest path cancellation. To aid
in our interpretations, we derive the keys using the standard key generation procedure
written in (2.13) and described in Section 2.6 - i.e., the passband frequency indices of the
CIR estimates deﬁne the key. The similarity criteria that we use is the partial-correlation,
which is deﬁned between Alice and Bob’s keys as
ρAB = |γHB γA|2 (3.16)
and ρAE is deﬁned similarly with the appropriate substitutions. It will be made clear in the
next chapter why we resort to this deﬁnition of similarity in the keys.
3.5.1 Time/Phase Align
In this section, the synchronization methods are compared with one another. We resort
to comparing time alignment algorithms using the experimental data set, details of which
are found in Section 2.7.2. It should be pointed out that the reason the experimental
data set is favored over numerical results for this study is because we have heuristically
found that when the one-sided exponential power delay proﬁle is used in simulation to
evaluate different timing algorithms, the ﬁrst path is often chosen as the time alignment
point simply because there is a relatively well-deﬁned threshold separating noise from
the ﬁrst path. In the measurement data set, we’ve found that there are often multipath
components which come before the strongest path that make the decision of choosing the
ﬁrst strongest path amore difﬁcult one since there isn’t a well-deﬁned threshold separating
residual multipaths from the ﬁrst strongest one.
Table 3.1 shows a comparison of the 3 different time alignment methods discussed
in this dissertation. We compute the probability that Alice and Bob make the correct
timing decision for the different algorithms. A mismatch indicates that Alice and Bob
chose different paths as a result of the timing synchronization algorithm. Table 3.1 also
shows results for when both parties choose βmax and βperc to minimize the probability
of mismatch in timing decision. The corresponding βmax and βperc are also given. To
provide the reader an intuitive description of when the max-based method example may
fail, we show Fig. 3.4. In this ﬁgure, one pair of realizations of the estimated CIRs from
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Table 3.1. Table showing the probability of Alice and Bob choosing the correct timing












0.9877 βmax = 1.00
Max-based
Threshold (Best)
0.9928 βmax = 0.85
Percentile-based
Threshold
0.8585 βperc = 0.50
Percentile-based
Threshold (Best)
0.9858 βperc = 0.98
the experimental data set is shown. This particular channel is chosen because it exhibits
what we deem to be the ’double-path’ problem. The double-path problem occurs when the
CIR of the wireless link between Alice and Bob contains two or more paths with similar
amplitudes. The presence of the channel noise at Alice and Bob’s receivers may lead to
different locations for the paths in cA[n] and cB[n].
The following observations can be made from Table 3.1. First, it can be seen that
the mean delay reference method gives the best results. Hence, if a feedback channel
is available for Alice and Bob to use, it is recommended to use it. However, when a
feedback channel is unavailable, choosing a threshold of βmax = 0.85 gives comparable
results. Furthermore, it can be seen that a method based on choosing the median value
of the path gains (as recommended in [74]) gives the least favorable results. In fact, from
our experimental data set, when the percentile is chosen larger (i.e., βperc = 0.98), the
likelihood of a mismatch due to timing synchronization is the least likely.
As a supplemental tool, we also present Fig. 3.5. Here, the probability of Alice and Bob
choosing the same path is plotted versus different values of βperc for the experimental data
set. It can be shown from this ﬁgure that choosing a threshold closer to the larger values
of channel gain (i.e., the stronger paths) gives Alice and Bob the best chance to be synchro-
nized to one another. Hence, a conclusion that can be derived from the observations thus
far is that time/phase synchronization is best achieved when the strongest path is utilized
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Figure 3.4. Example channel that shows the ’double-path’ problem.
for time alignment purposes.
3.5.2 Strongest Path Cancellation
Now the discussion will be extended to include the passive adversary - Eve - who
also follows Alice and Bob in time/phase alignment. To show how well the proposed
key generation algorithm uses both time and amplitude to its advantage, we resort to
real-world and numerical results.
3.5.2.1 Simulation Results
The parameters chosen for the simulationmatch the experiment. For the simulation, we
assume a block fading channel model and no fractional timing offset for all three parties.
Given this setup, Monte Carlo simulations were processed according to the following
procedure.
1. Alice and Bob generate a probing beacon consisting of 25 periods of a length N =
64 ZC sequence. This is interpolated by a factor of L = 4 using a square-root
raised-cosine ﬁlter with a roll-off factor of 1/2 and transmitted at a sampling rate
of 1Ts = 130MHz.
2. The beacon is transmitted across a simulated wireless channel. The channel follows
the simulation model described in 2.7.1. We use a delay spread of T¯m = 50 ns. Alice
and Bob share the same channel and the only difference between the Alice-Bob and
Alice-Eve’s channels are in the M complex-valued gains.
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Figure 3.5. Probability of Alice and Bob choosing the correct timing decision versus βperc
for the percentile-based time/phase alignment method discussed in Section 3.3.2.1
3. Noise is independently added to the signal received by Alice, Bob, and Eve.
4. Channel estimation, time alignment, and key generation are processed according
to the procedure described in Chapter 2. Note that for time alignment, Eve time
aligns according to her own strongest path as she hasmore similarity to the Alice-Bob
channel with this approach.
Fig. 3.6 shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of ρAB and ρAE before and
after SPC from 10,000 runs of the described simulation. Alice and Bob have an SNR of 10
dB, while Eve has zero additive noise in her received signal. In addition to these curves, the
partial correlation between the M complex gains of the Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve’s channels
is also plotted and is denoted by ρR.
A few interesting aspects of the proposed key generation algorithm can be found in
Fig. 3.6. First, as expected, a slight decorrelation occurs between Alice and Bob’s keys after
SPC due to removal of the strongest path. However, this decorrelation is small. In fact, the
average value of ρAB before and after SPC at the present SNR of 10 dB is 0.994 and 0.985,
respectively.
Next, consider the curves depicted in Fig. 3.6 which show the partial correlation be-
tween Alice and Eve’s keys before and after SPC, as well as the parameter ρR. First, it
can be seen that before SPC, timing and phase recovery causes Alice and Eve’s keys to be
relatively strongly correlated. However, after SPC, the partial correlation bias due to time
and phase synchronization in (3.14) is removed and thus the similarity between the keys
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Figure 3.6. CDF of partial correlation between Alice and Bob’s keys ρAB and Alice and
Eve’s keys ρAE from simulation results using a channel model in which path gains are
derived from an exponential power delay proﬁle with RMS delay spread of 50 ns. Dashed
lines show results after SPC is applied. Additionally, ρR shows the partial correlation
between the M complex-valued gains of Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve channels
is signiﬁcantly less.
To help the reader grasp an understanding of the signiﬁcance of Fig. 3.6, we present
the set of plots in Fig. 3.7. Fig. 3.7 shows one CIR realization of Alice and Eve’s channel
that we feel is helpful in understanding Fig. 3.6. First, the path gains of this particular CIR
realization is shown in the top-left while the ﬁltered path gains are shown in the top-right
plot. It can be seen that the second path is the strongest path of Alice’s CIR while the
ﬁrst path is the strongest for Eve. It should also be noted that the path in Eve’s channel
corresponding to the location of Alice’s strongest path is very low in power. Next, the two
parties time align using the strongest path and the result is shown in the bottom-left plot.
It can be seen now that the synchronization has caused both Alice and Eve’s strongest
paths to be located in the same temporal index, thus increasing the similarities of their
CIR responses and subsequently in the keys they generate. Finally, SPC is applied in the
bottom-right plot. A few interesting points can be observed in the bottom-right plot. First,
it can be seen for this example that when both parties time align according to their strongest
path, Eve’s CIR shifts to the right while Alice’s shifts to the left. This time-shift functions in
reducing similarity in the CIRs of Alice and Eve. However, after the time-shift, Alice and
Eve’s CIRs are highly correlated due to the strongest paths of both node’s being located at














































Figure 3.7. These set of plots show the main concept of SPC using one realization of the
simulated channels. The top right plot shows the path gains used to generate the CIR at
the nodes of Alice and Eve. Next, the path gains are ﬁltered with the probing pulse p(t).
The bottom-right plot shows results after time alignment according to the strongest path.
Finally, the bottom-left plot shows CIRs when SPC is applied to remove the strongest path.
Note that this is the component of the CIRs giving rise to the greatest amount of similarity
between Alice and Eve’s CIRs after max alignment.
ﬁgure, the combination of steps results in Eve’s CIR being both unsynchronized (in terms
of time) and uncorrelated (in terms of channel gains). In short, Fig. 3.7 helps explain that
the proposed augmentation of SPC uses both time and amplitude of the CIRs as a means
of enhancing security of the key.
3.5.2.2 Experimentation Results
Fig. 3.8 shows the CDF of ρAB and ρAE before and after SPC from the experimental data.
Similar to Fig. 3.6, we see a slight decorrelation between Alice and Bob’s keys after SPC as
well as a signiﬁcant increase of dissimilarity between Alice and Eve’s keys. Results shown
in Fig. 3.6 and Fig. 3.8 are fairly similar, though over-the-air measurements show Alice
and Eve’s keys to be slightly more correlated in the experiment than in the simulation.
A possible cause for this is that the channel model used in our simulation contains more
randomness and/or paths than observed in the measurements.
Fig. 3.6 and Fig. 3.8 indicate that Eve’s key has been decorrelated through SPC. At the
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Figure 3.8. CDF of partial correlation between Alice and Bob’s keys ρAB and Alice and
Eve’s keys ρAE from over-the-air data obtained from the experiment. Dashed lines show
results after SPC is applied.
same time, the keys of Alice and Bob maintain similarity. However, the question looming
at this point is whether this is worth the reduction in similarity between Alice and Bob’s
keys. We will examine this very point in the next chapter.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter, along with the previous one, conclude the key generation portion of the
secure information transmission system. The main topic of this chapter was time and
phase alignment. It was ﬁrst shown that synchronization is needed to be done by Alice
and Bob in order to achieve channel reciprocity. However, a consequence of synchroniza-
tion is that it allows the eavesdropping adversary to also synchronize with the legitimate
users. We propose the use of strongest path cancellation (SPC) as a means of maintaining
synchronization between the main users while ensuring security of the key. The trade-off
in using SPC - that is left to be examined in the next chapter - is whether the gain in secrecy
is worth the loss in reciprocity of the key.
CHAPTER 4
ARTIFICIAL NOISE FOR MULTICARRIER
SPREAD SPECTRUM SYSTEMS
This chapter ties together the topics discussed so far in this dissertation into one secure
information transmission system. The secure information transmission systemwe propose
uses SS technology as a means of communicating conﬁdential information-bearing sym-
bols. In addition, artiﬁcial noise is added to enhance secrecy. The key developed in pre-
vious parts is introduced as an integral part of this system. First, we discuss background
literature on artiﬁcial noise. Next, the system model of our SS-based secure information
transmission system is detailed and the security level of the system is analyzed. Finally, we
present results related to the proposed methodologies and end with concluding remarks.
4.1 Related Work
In their seminal paper, Goel and Negi [24, 25] proposed a unique transmit strategy that
uses artiﬁcial noise in order to confuse the passive eavesdropper. The main concept of this
work is to use the degrees of freedom provided by multiple transmit antennas to generate
noise that lies in the null-space of the channel between Alice and Bob. This noise is called
artiﬁcial noise and it is added to the information signal. At the legitimate receiver, the
artiﬁcial noise is removed by the channel while the adversary’s channel is degraded by
this noise.
Fig. 4.1 presents a standard model of the multiple-antenna artiﬁcial noise transmit
strategy in [24, 25]. The basic model deﬁnes Alice to have NT transmit antennas and Bob
and Eve to have NR = 1 receive antennas. In Fig. 4.1, Alice transmits the information
bearing vector xk as
xk =
CHk
‖Ck‖ sk + vk (4.1)









Artificial Noise - vk
Figure 4.1. Illustration of the artiﬁcial noise transmitter.
connects the pair of legitimate users, and vk is artiﬁcial noise. The artiﬁcial noise is chosen
to lie in the null-space of the Ck so that Ckvk = 0. Next, Bob and Eve respectively receive
yk and zk as follows
yk = Ckxk + ηk (4.2)
=
CkCHk
‖Ck‖ sk +Ckvk + ηk (4.3)
= ‖Ck‖sk + ηk (4.4)
zk = Hkxk + k (4.5)
=
HkCHk
‖Ck‖ sk +Hkvk + k (4.6)
(4.7)
where ηk and k are i.i.d channel noise and Hk is the channel that connects Alice and Eve.
Notice that the artiﬁcial noise is successfully nulliﬁed by Bobwhile it degrades the received
response of Eve.
The following are assumptions made in the standard artiﬁcial noise signal model. 1)
The channel Ck is assumed to be perfectly known by Alice, Bob, and Eve. Most works in
this area have used the assumption of perfect CSI knowledge, despite the impracticality
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of it. To obtain this characterization, it is typically assumed that Ck is estimated by Bob
and fed back to Alice through a noiseless and insecure link. Since the link is insecure,
Eve is therefore assumed to know Ck perfectly. However, despite Eve’s knowledge of Ck,
as we’ve seen in (4.6), the standard artiﬁcial noise transmit strategy is built to withstand
such adversaries (i.e., see Fig. 4.1 for an illustration). In other words, the secrecy of the
artiﬁcial noise communication system is independent of the secrecy of the channel gains.
2) The channel vectors Ck and Hk have elements which are assumed to be independent
zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables. Such a situation would occur in ’rich-
scattering’ environments, though it is an open problem in the literature to analyze how
information-theoretic security results could be extended to other types of channel models.
3) Additionally, a block fading is assumed so that Ck and Hk are constant over a block of
symbols and independent across blocks. This means that the channel is assumed to be
static for the total time needed for the artiﬁcial communication setup. For a given time
index k, this corresponds to the total time required for a) estimating the CSI between
Alice and Bob, b) feeding this estimate back to Alice, and c) securely transmitting the
information symbols across this channel to nullify the artiﬁcial noise generated using this
CSI.
A very important parameter of the artiﬁcial noise communication system is the signal-
to-artiﬁcial noise ratio denoted by φ. This ratio describes the fraction of total power al-
located to the information-bearing signal sk. The remaining transmit power is ﬁlled with
artiﬁcial noise. In [24, 25], this parameter is found through maximization of the secrecy
capacity - where secrecy capacity is deﬁned as the maximum rate at which Alice-Bob can
communicate a message without the eavesdropper being able to decode it. The power
allocation approach in [25] is only valid when Alice knows the full CSI - i.e., the CSI be-
tween herself and Bob and herself and Eve. Though this is an impractical power allocation
strategy for a malicious adversary not within the network, it is useful in the sense that it
gives the bounds of what is achievable with this secure communication setup.
In [75], a closed-form expression for the lower bound of the ergodic secrecy capacity is
obtained. Using this expression, it is found that for non-colluding and noiseless Eves, the
optimal power allocation strategy is to distribute power evenly between signal and artiﬁcial
noise in the high SNR regime. This was found to be true even for the case when Eve’s CSI
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is not known to Alice. In obtaining this result, the authors in [75] assume that Alice has
perfect knowledge of the CSI between herself and BoB. Additionally, in [75], they discuss
the effect of imperfect CSI on the artiﬁcial noise system. They ﬁnd, surprisingly, that less
power should be allocated to information signal as channel estimation error is increased.
This is because when Bob has imperfect CSI, it is more efﬁcient to degrade Eve’s channel
than to improve Bob’s.
Other approaches for determining the signal-to-artiﬁcial noise ratio depend on the
amount of knowledge of Eve’s channel available to Alice. In another report [76], Alice is
assumed to have full CSI information. The motivation for this study is in situations where
Alice is a base-station in a cellular network and knows the CSI between herself and partic-
ipating users. Some participating users (i.e., Eves) may attempt to access paying services
unavailable to them but available to Bob. Another situation applicable to this scenario
would be one where Bob is trying to access conﬁdential information and Alice wishes not
to communicate this data in an isotropic manner so as to minimize the chance that other
participating users in the network overhear this private transmission. In such situations,
the authors in [76] propose an artiﬁcial noise aided transmit beamforming strategy. Here,
the knowledge of the full CSI information allows Alice to pattern the artiﬁcial noise in a
manner helpful to Bob and detrimental to the link quality of Eve.
In our report, we are particularly interested in evaluating the scenario in which Eve’s
CSI is unknown to Alice. In this case, secrecy cannot be guaranteed since Alice does not
know how much artiﬁcial noise to inject to Eve’s channel. The approach taken by [77] is of
particular interest when Eve’s CSI is unkown. The power allocation strategy that they use
in [77] is to meet a target SNR at the intended receiver to satisfy a link quality requirement.
The rest of the available transmit power is then devoted to artiﬁcial noise.
4.2 System Model for MC-SS With Artiﬁcial Noise
Discussion of artiﬁcial noise in the literature - e.g., [24, 25, 75–77] - has largely been in
the context of multiple antenna systems. Rather than using multiple antennas to obtain
the necessary dimensionality with which to transmit artiﬁcial noise, we introduce the use
of chips in spread spectrum for this purpose. The artiﬁcial noise is produced in the null-
space of the spreading gain vector generated in the secure key generation step discussed in
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previous sections of this dissertation.
A block diagram for the proposed MC-SS transmitter with the addition of artiﬁcial
noise is shown in Fig. 4.2 and its corresponding receiver is in Fig. 4.3. Note that the
receiver does not need additional circuitry to account for the artiﬁcial noise since it is
removed by the despreader and any residual error due to artiﬁcial noise leaking into the
information space is taken as additive noise. Additionally, the ”Multicarrier Modulator”
and ”Multicarrier Demodulator” blocks in Fig. 4.2 and Fig. 4.3 are meant to allow for any
MC-SS based waveform design such as OFDM, FB-MC-SS [34], etc. We purposely do not
restrict our study to any particular MC-SS-based method as the following system model
can be easily extended to any MC-SS waveform. Additionally, it is noted for the reader’s
beneﬁt that the system model in this section will reuse some of the notations in Section 4.1.
The mathematical notations and variables used in Secion 4.1 are local to that section and
the notations in this section will be carried out through the chapter.
Following the transmitter in Fig. 4.2, Alice constructs the transmit signal using the key
from previous discussions as
xk = γAsk + vk (4.8)
where k = 0, 1, . . . ,K − 1 and vk is artiﬁcial noise vector, added to increase security in
presence of an eavesdropper. The artiﬁcial noise vk is selected to lie in the null-space of γA,
so that γHAvk = 0. More explicitly, vk is generated as the residual between an i.i.d circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian noise vector - wk - and its projection onto the space of γA as
follows
vk = wk − γAγHAwk . (4.9)
The total transmit power across the entire occupied bandwidth can be obtained by
combining (4.8) and (4.9). This gives


















































































Figure 4.3. MC-SS transmitter block diagram
and the term N−1N arises from the fact that artiﬁcial noise is generated from a complete
N-dimensional vector space with one of its dimensions removed. We denote the fraction
of power allocated to the information signal as φ. This implies that




N − 1 . (4.13)
Following (4.8), the signal received by Bob and Eve aftermulticarrier demodulation and
application of a zero-forcing channel equalizer is respectively given by
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yk = xk + ηk (4.14)
zk = xk + k (4.15)
where the components of ηk and k arise from channel noise. Note that the elements of ηk
and k may not be i.i.d due to frequency selectivity of the channel. The SNR between the










where σ2 = E[Hk k] and σ
2
 = E[Hk k].
Next, Bob and Eve despread their received signals from (4.14) and (4.15) with their own
spreading gains to get
γHB yk = γ
H
B (xk + ηk)
= γHB γAsk + γ
H




γHE zk = γ
H
E (xk + k)
= γHE γAsk + γ
H
E vk + γ
H
E k . (4.19)




N−1 (1− φ)(1− ρAB)SNRiB + 1
(4.20)
where
ρAB = |γHB γA|2 (4.21)
Equations (4.20) and (4.21) are deﬁned similarly for the Alice-Eve link with the appropriate
substitutions.
A subtle point of the formulation in this section is that the parameters ρAB and SNRiB are
kept separate from one another, despite the fact that they are related. The reason for this is
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that the dissimilarity between keys is not only dependent on SNR, but on other factors as
well. One example of this from our algorithm is the precursor step in which time averaging
multiple channel probes is taken as a measure to reduce channel noise. The success of this
step is dependent on the coherence time of the channel relative to the number of probes
per beacon. If the channel is static over the duration of a packet, the time averaging will
be relatively successful compared to when there are time-varying factors (i.e., channel
variation, frequency offsets, etc.) that may increase error due to incoherent averaging.
Another example is estimation error such as time misalignment which may signiﬁcantly
reduce similarity between keys. Moreover, SPC also introduces a decorrelation effect on
the keys as well. For these reasons and many more, we keep ρAB and SNRiB separate from
one another.
Note when there is no artiﬁcial noise, i.e., φ = 1, that (4.20) reduces to SNRoB =
NρABSNRiB. This shows that the despreading procedure, through coherent linear com-
bination of the received signal vector, allows Bob to achieve an SNR up to N times the link
SNR given in (4.16). On the other hand, if Eve can gain access to the spreading code γA,
she can decode the information symbols sent by Alice. This highlights the necessity of the
algorithm discussed in where Alice and Bob make use of the reciprocal wireless channel to
generate a pair of similar keys while Eve, despite following the same steps as the legitimate
nodes, generates a signiﬁcantly different key.
To enlighten the reader on how artiﬁcial noise can be used to boost security, we plot
SNRoB and SNR
o
E as a function of the received signal SNR at φ = 1/N in Fig. 4.4. We use
the terms SNRi and SNRo to respectively describe the SNR before and after despreading
at either Bob or Eve’s node, depending on the context. The values of ρAB and ρAE were
chosen arbitrarily to show that when Alice and Bob share nearly identical keys, they have
a signiﬁcant SNR advantage compared to the adversary who generates a different key.
4.2.1 Artiﬁcial Noise Transmit Strategy
An important parameter for artiﬁcial noise transmission systems is the signal-to-artiﬁcial
noise ratio φ. In [25], this parameter is found throughmaximization of the secrecy capacity.
This power allocation strategy is applicable only when Alice has perfect knowledge of the
full CSI - e.g., the CSI between herself and Bob and herself and Eve. Since the knowledge
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Figure 4.4. Plot of the SNR after despreading vs. receiver SNR for φ = 1/N and selected
values of ρAB and ρAE.
of perfect CSI between Bob and Eve is not possible in practice, this method of selection of
the artiﬁcial noise power may be only of interest from a theoretical point of view.
Here, we are interested in practical scenarios where Eve’s CSI is not known to Alice.
In this case, secrecy cannot be guaranteed as Alice does not know how much artiﬁcial
noise to inject to Eve’s channel. With the assumption of Eve’s CSI remaining unkown, an
approach taken by [77] distributes φ to meet a target SNR at Bob’s node, assuming that the
Alice-Bob CSI is perfectly known. The rest of the available transmit power is devoted to
artiﬁcial noise, hoping this will sufﬁciently deteriorate the Eve’s channel such that she will
not be able to decode the transmit message
Our artiﬁcial noise power allocation strategy follows the same idea of dedicating enough
power to the information subspace to ensure a certain link quality between Alice and
Bob, while the low quality of the received signal at Eve is almost surely guaranteed.
Furthermore, we do not make the assumption that perfect knowledge of Alice-Bob CSI
is available.
Instead, we propose a power allocation strategy inwhichAlice dedicates enough power
to the information symbols to ensure a target SNR is met for Bob so long as the similarity
of their keys - quantiﬁed by ρAB - is larger than a threshold ρmin.
The parameter φ for our signal-to-artiﬁcial noise power allocation strategy can be de-
termined by replacing SNRoB in (4.20) with a target SNR - SNR
o
T - and ρAB with threshold
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ρmin. Solving for φ with these substitutions in place gives
φ =
N
N−1 (1− ρmin)SNRiB + 1
N





As a check, note that if the spreading codes are assumed perfectly known by Alice and





This is the same result to the one reported in [77]. Note that the assumption here is
that Alice knows the SNR between the main link and uses it to allocate power to the
information symbols.
A nice feature of this power allocation strategy is that it connects the values of ρAB to
the SNR seen by Bob’s receiver after despreading. In fact, it is shown in Appendix B that
if φ is obtained from (4.22), then
P(SNRoB < SNRoT) = P(ρAB < ρmin) . (4.24)
To further help in understanding the beneﬁtes of the artiﬁcial noise power allocation
strategy that we propose, we present a plot in Fig. 4.5. In this plot, the CDF of SNRoB is
plotted using the experimental data set from Chapter 2. The target SNR is set to 10 dB and
the black dots in the ﬁgure represent this. Solid lines in Fig. 4.5 represent the case when
SNRiB = 10 dB and dashed lines show SNR
i
B = 0 dB and N is set to 64. Note that when the
link SNR is larger, more artiﬁcial noise is used. The value of ρmin was set to 0.975 and 1 to
compare our strategy to the one from [77] which assumes that Alice has perfect knowledge
of main link CSI. The signal-to-artiﬁcial noise ratio φ used to generate the plot is given in
Table 4.1 for all cases.
Fig. 4.5 shows the following. If dissimilarity between Alice and Bob’s keys is unac-
counted for (i.e., ρmin = 1), the target data rate is never met. The problem is worse when φ
is increased and there is approximately a 2 dB range over which SNRoB is spread across. On
the other hand, with our proposed artiﬁcial noise power allocation strategy, it can be seen
that the probability that the target data rate is met remains at a constant value of ∼ 95%
regardless of the value of φ.
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Figure 4.5. CDF of SNRoB for two different values of ρmin when SNR
o
T = 10 dB. Solid lines
show the case when SNRiB = 0 dB and dashed lines show when SNR
i
B = 10 dB. The data
used here is obtained from the experiment.
Table 4.1. Values of φ used to generate Fig 4.5.
SNRiB (dB) ρmin = 1 ρmin = 0.975
0 0.1563 0.1637
10 0.0156 0.02
One ﬁnal point to be noted about our power allocation method is that there is a limit
to how low ρmin can be set for a minimal signal-to-artiﬁcial noise ratio φmin that a designer
would consider, given a target SNR. To determine this limit, we set φ = φmin in (4.22) and





SNRoT(1− φmin) + (N − 1)φmin
(4.25)
We set the parameter φmin = 1N for reasons that will become clear later in this disser-
tation. This signal-to-artiﬁcial noise ratio will also be called the golden ratio in remaining
parts of this dissertation. When φmin = 1N , the minimum amount of mismatch given a







In the following, we present two different options for choosing ρmin. One in which
training data is utilized to obtain an a-priori estimate for ρmin and another method for
which training data is not available.
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4.2.1.1 Training Method
The value of ρmin is determined ofﬂine using training data and programmed into the
transceivers prior to communication. This may be used by a designer to make sure that
a target link reliability condition is met so long as the training data is appropriate for the
design. Here, ρmin is chosen so that
P(SNRoB < SNRoT) = P(ρAB < ρmin) = δoT (4.27)
where δoT is some reliability constraint chosen by the designer.
A remark should be made about the idea of using training data to ﬁnd ρmin. First,
through our experiment on channel probing, we’ve seen that non-reciprocities in channel
measurements take different forms for different pairs of nodes. One easy way in which
this can be visualized is in the situation where one pair of nodes may have a frequency
offset of 10Hz while another may have a frequency offset of 100Hz - thus the second pair
of nodes may introduce more differences between keys than the ﬁrst pair of nodes.
In short, each node has its own radiometric signature (see [78], where the idea of us-
ing radiometric signatures is used as a means of node identiﬁcation). The radiometric
signature of each node can be deﬁned by characteristics unique to it and examples of
radiometric signatures which can contribute to differences between a pair of reciprocal
channel measurements would be clock skews, carrier frequency offsets, IQ impairments,
among other RF hardware traits. Hence, in practice, we recommend to obtain training data
between many different pairs of nodes as a means of ﬁnding a good estimate for ρmin,
4.2.1.2 Target φmin
Another idea which does not require training data is one in which ρmin is chosen so
that φ = φmin occurs at SNRiB = ψSNR
o
T. Here, ψ is a constant used in deﬁning the SNR at
which the maximum amount of artiﬁcial noise would be used. By making the appropriate
substitutions to (4.22), we get the following solution by solving for ρmin
ρmin =
N
N−1 (1− φmin)ψSNRoT + 1
N
N−1 (1− φmin)ψSNRoT + ψ
(4.28)











To give the reader an intuitive understanding of the concept behind this method, we
present a set of plots. In Fig. 4.6, the parameter φ is plotted against Bob’s receiver SNR
for different values of ψ. The target SNR is set to 10 dB and the black circles in the ﬁgure
represent the point at which φ is equal to the golden ratio of φ = 1/N. For all curves,
it can be seen that when Bob is SNR limited, more power is allocated to the information
symbols so that the target can be met. In other words, φ is larger when the SNRiB is low so
that SNRoB = SNR
o
T for a given value of ρmin.
Another aspect that can be seen from Fig. 4.6 is that when ρmin is set lower, the signal-
to-artiﬁcial noise ratio is strategically increased so that the target SNR of 10 dB can be
met. Finally, it can be seen that when ψ = 1 and ρmin = 1, the golden ratio is met for
SNRiB = SNR
o
T. Hence, in the ideal scenario in which there is no mismatch between keys,
the minimum receiver SNR needed to transmit with the golden ratio is when SNRiB =





T. Similarly the trend can be extended to increasing values of ψ. In short,
this ﬁgure shows the basic concept behind the Target φ method - that when ρmin is set based
on (4.29), φ = φmin when SNRiB = ψSNR
o
T.
Fig. 4.7 shows ρmin as a function of the target SNR (in dB) for selected values of ψ
when φ = 1/N. In this plot, it is shown that when the target SNR is chosen larger, the
value of ρmin approaches 1 to meet the high demands of the system - suggesting that
higher target rates can only be met when there is very little dissimilarity between keys
generated by Alice and Bob. This also agrees with intuition in that high target data rates
can only be met for keys obtained at high SNRs. Another observation from Fig. 4.7 is that
the system is more forgiving to mismatch in keys when SNRoT is low. The value of ρmin
signiﬁcantly drops when the value of ψ is increased from 1 to 2 and when ψ is increased,
ρmin asymptotically approaches the dashed line in Fig. 4.7. The dashed line plots (4.26)
which gives minimum value of ρmin needed to meet the target SNR for φ = 1/N. Hence,
Fig. 4.7 shows that ρmin should be above the dashed line to meet the speciﬁed target SNR
when φ = 1/N.
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Figure 4.6. Plot of φ vs. SNRiB in dB for ψ = 1, 2, and 10















Figure 4.7. Plot of ρmin vs. SNRiB in dB for selected values of ψ when φ = 1/N.
4.2.2 Comparison to Physical-Layer Key Generation Systems
In this section, we will compare our proposed secure information communication strat-
egy with traditional physical-layer key generation methods - the core concepts of which
are described in Section 1.1.3. Recall from our previous discussion that physical-layer key
generation techniques largely follow four steps: 1) randomness sharing, 2) information rec-
onciliation, 3) privacy ampliﬁcation, and 4) secure communications. In short, the ﬁrst three
steps aim to create a ’secret-key’ using measurements of the reciprocal wireless channel.
The key’s maximum size depends on the secrecy and entropy of the shared randomness.
The result of the ﬁrst three steps of the traditional physical-layer key generation system
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produces a ‘secret-key’ usingmeasurements of the reciprocal wireless channel. By contrast,
the key discussed in our report uses only the ﬁrst step for reasons that will become clear
as we proceed. Regardless of the key being used, the main difference between traditional
physical-layer key generation systems and the secure information transmission system
discussed in this dissertation is in how the message is encrypted with the key. In other
words, the two methods mainly differ in the ‘secure communications’ step.
The standard approach for secure communications with physical-layer key generation
systems is to use a one-time pad. Another option which is not information-theoretically
secure but, rather, computationally secure is to use the key as part of a symmetric en-
cryption algorithm. The physical-layer key generation system to which we are making a
comparison will use a one-time pad for secure communication.
Given a key and message, Fig. 4.8 shows a comparison between the transmitters of the
secure SS communication system and the traditional physical-layer key generation with
one-time pad solution. The left-hand side shows the physical-layer key generation method
while the right shows the secure SS system.
On the left side of Fig. 4.8, Alice encrypts M message bits with M key bits by perform-
ing an XOR operation on the message with the key to generate the codeword X . Note that
the criteria of the one-time pad described in Section 1.1.1 should be met in order to ensure
information-theoretic security when using the one-time pad. To retrieve the message M,
Bob applies an XOR to the X with the key K.
The secure SS communication system is depicted on the right-hand side of Fig. 4.8.
Since our technique is applied at the physical-layer, the message M bits are converted to
symbols by using a digitial modulation scheme, such as BPSK or QAM. The rate of digital
modulation - i.e., RT in Fig. 4.8 - deﬁnes the number of bits encoded in each symbol. Note
here that the key length N is different than the symbol length.
For the proposed secure information transmitter, the key γ can be any vector that
spans the complex-valued N dimensional space. Because of this, the key is not necessarily
limited to the one discussed in our dissertation. In fact, any physical-layer key generation
system could pass any N length key to the secure SS system. A major beneﬁt of this fact
is that the key does not need to be quantized into a ﬁnite alphabet. Therefore, information
contained in any given reciprocal wireless channel estimate is not lost due to the process
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Figure 4.8. MC-SS transmitter block diagram
of quantization.
In our dissertation, we have simply adopted the complex-valued frequency response of
the channel as our key. Our key generation algorithm is relatively simple because informa-
tion reconciliation and privacy ampliﬁcation steps are not applied to the key. Information
reconciliation is not used because the secure SS communication system is fault-tolerant. A
detailed discussion of the fault-tolerance property of our method will be discussed later
in this section. Privacy ampliﬁcation is skipped for two reasons. First, since information
reconciliation is not applied, there is no information leaked to Eve about the key that Alice
and Bob use. Second, we do not remove correlation between elements of the key. This is
because when the golden ratio of φ = 1/N is used - i.e., a lot of artiﬁcial noise is added to
the transmit signal - the correlation matrix of the transmitted signal is an identity matrix.
The reason that the transmitted signal has an identity correlation matrix is described later
in Section 4.4.2. As a result of this, even though two elements within a key vector may be
highly correlated, the same two elements within the codeword vector are uncorrelated.
To form a codeword using both the message and key, Alice spreads each of the individ-
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ual symbols of the message with her key γA. The artiﬁcial noise v is added to the spreaded
signal and it lies in the null-space of the key. The transmitted sequence xk can be written
as
xk = γAsk + vk (4.30)
Next, Bob decrypts Alice’s transmitted signal by despreading the transmitted code-
word with his key γB so that
γHB yk = γ
H
B (xk + ηk)
= γHB γAsk + γ
H
B vk + γ
H
B ηk (4.31)
Recall from the discussion of our artiﬁcial noise transmit strategy in Section 4.2.1 that
if Bob’s key is ‘similar enough’ to Alice’s key such that ρAB > ρmin - and therefore SNRoB >
SNRoT - then the following approximation of (4.31) is valid
γHB yk ≈ sk . (4.32)
Notice that Bob’s key just needs to be ’similar enough’ to Alice’s to decrypt themessage.
This implies that it does not have to be exactly the same key as Alice. This simple idea
describes one fundamental difference between traditional physical-layer key generation
methods and our secure SS communication system. Physical-layer key generation meth-
ods are inherently designed around minimizing ‘bit-disagreements’ between Alice and
Bob’s keys. Any bit disagreements between Alice and Bob’s key results in Bob incorrectly
decoding the message. Moreover, when the one-time pad is used, and each message is
equally likely to occur within its own ﬁnite alphabet, a bit disagreement in the key results
in Bob decoding the wrong message and having no way of knowing that it is the wrong
message.
In contrast, for our secure SS communication system, Alice encodes the codeword xk
to be tolerant to minor differences between Alice and Bob’s keys. The amount of fault-
tolerance is quantiﬁed by ρmin. Making the reasonable assumption that Alice knows the
SNR between herself and Bob, Alice calculates the signal-to-artiﬁcial noise ratio φ using
(4.22). As long as the similarity between Alice and Bob’s keys - quantiﬁed by ρAB from
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(4.21) - is larger than ρmin, then Bob should be able to successfully decode Alice’s transmit-
ted signal.
We now give the following example to further explain this concept. Assume that Alice
and Bob share a 64 bit key. The key is derived from the reciprocal wireless channel.
Due to the many possible non-reciprocities which can cause bit disagreements in the key
shared between Alice and Bob, the key has 1 bit error. Using the one-time pad, Bob is
unable to decode the message encrypted by Alice. Note that information reconciliation
and privacy ampliﬁcation are a standard approach in physical-layer key generation. A 1 bit
discrepancy between Alice and Bob’s keys can easily be handled through an information
reconciliation protocol such as Cascasde [79]. Nevertheless, we will proceed with the
discussion as if there is a 1 bit disagreement between Alice and Bob’s codes even after
information reconciliation.
For the proposed secure transmission system in this example, ρmin is set so that the
communication is robust against 2 out of 64 bit errors. This gives ρmin ∼ 0.9375. For this
example, SNRiB is taken to be large enough value so that Alice can dedicate enough power
to artiﬁcial noise to meet the golden ratio of φ = 1/N. Assuming negligible noise between




≈ 11.7dB . (4.34)
Recall from our discussion in Section 4.2.3 that the target SNR, SNRoT, deﬁnes the desired
link quality between Alice and Bob. Again, assuming that noise has minimal impact on
the communication in this example, the target SNR is met as long as ρAB > ρmin. In this
example, the maximum target SNR is 11.7 dB, which means Alice can communicate up
to a maximum rate of RT = log2(1+ SNR
o
T) = 4 bits per symbol. Notice here that Alice
can pack more bits per symbol if ρmin was set to be tolerant to only 1 bit disagreement in
the key. This essentially describes a trade-off between fault-tolerance and secure commu-
nication rate - i.e., as fault-tolerance is increased, the maximum rate (in bits per symbol)
of the conﬁdential message is decreased. To summarize this example, our proposed SS
communication system allows Alice to communicate up to 4 conﬁdential bits per symbol
even if Bob’s key differs from Alice’s by 2 bits.
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At this point, we would like to address a few concerns a reader may have about the
proposed secure SS system. First, it can be seen from Fig. 4.8 and similarly in (4.30) that
multiple information symbols are spread with the same key. At ﬁrst glance, it may seem
that communicating multiple symbols with just one key may give inadequate security.
Indeed, without artiﬁcial noise, an adversary could easily determine the key from the
transmitted sequence using a blind detection algorithm. In Section 4.3.2, we will discuss
how proper design of the artiﬁcial noise parameters can allow Alice to securely communi-
cate multiple conﬁdential symbols using the same key against an adversary with advanced
blind detection methods.
Another concern the reader may have is regarding the security of our technique against
an adversary who performs a brute-force attack. A brute-force attack is one in which
the adversary performs an exhaustive search over the key space to determine the key.
Admittedly, one beneﬁt of the one-time pad over our secure information transmitter is
that it is robust to brute-force attacks. In the one-time pad, every possible M-length key
and message within their own deﬁned ﬁnite alphabet are equally likely to occur. When
Eve tries all possible combinations of the key, she may see the correct message but has no
way of knowing that this message is the correct message. Equivalently, Eve has no way of
knowing what the right key is. In contrast, for our secure SS technique, when Eve guesses
multiple different CIRs to determine the key, she will eventually ﬁnd one which removes
the artiﬁcial noise. Therefore, our system has an innate signature through which Eve can
differentiate the correct key from incorrect ones. We will address the brute-force attack
more thoroughly in Section 4.3.3.
4.2.3 Comparison to the Traditional Artiﬁcial Noise Systems from Literature
The secure information transmission system proposed in this dissertation makes use of
the chips available to SS systems to produce artiﬁcial noise and thus, it is easily adoptable
to single-antenna systems. This concept differs signiﬁcantly from those in the literature -
e.g., [18][20] - which use multiple antennas as means of obtaining the necessary dimen-
sionality with which to produce artiﬁcial noise.
The original artiﬁcial noise system [24, 25] adds noise to the transmit signal that lies
in the null-space of the channel, while information is transmitted in the range space of
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said channel. In contrast, the secure information transmission system in this dissertation
makes use of spreading gain vectors to null out the artiﬁcial noise as opposed to the CSI.
The spreading codes are obtained using the wireless channel; however, they are processed
in such a way that the codes are highly similar between Alice and Bob while signiﬁcantly
dissimilar between Alice and Eve.
The idea of using spreading codes, rather than the wireless channel, to null out the
artiﬁcial noise has a few consequences, both good and bad. First, in traditional artiﬁcial
noise systems, the wireless channel is used to remove artiﬁcial noise and it is assumed that
the channel follows a block-fadingmodel. In contrast, ourmethod does not require that the
artiﬁcial noise be removed by the wireless channel. This is helpful from an implementation
standpoint in situations where the wireless channel is not well-approximated by a block-
fading channel model.
Another consequence of our approach is regarding Eve’s knowledge of the key. For
the traditional artiﬁcial noise system, even if the adversary perfectly knows the main link
channel, it does not help her since artiﬁcial noise is leaked into Eve’s received signal by the
Alice-Eve channel. In fact, this is one of the selling points of the traditional artiﬁcial noise
method - that security can be assured even if Eve has full CSI knowledge. However, in our
approach, if Eve knows the spreading code that Alice is using, security is compromised.
This point is not a very signiﬁcant drawback for our proposed system because Eve having
full knowledge of everyone’s CSI is an impractical scenario to begin with, despite the
strength of that assumption in traditional artiﬁcial noise systems.
Finally, another consequence of our artiﬁcial noise model compared to the traditional
setup is regarding the number of symbols which can be transmitted by Alice. In the con-
ventional transmission system, the number of symbols which can be transmitted by Alice
is limited by the assumed duration of the block-fading channel model. For our scenario,
we may transmit as many symbols as required with one spreading code sequence. This
motivates our study - shown in an upcoming section of the dissertation - in determining
the number of symbols which can be transmitted by Alice with one spreading code before
security is compromised.
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4.3 Security Level of Proposed Solution
In this section, two different attack scenarios are evaluated to justify the security of the
proposed solution. In the ﬁrst scenario, the eavesdropping abilities of Eve are tested and
in the second scenario, we look at the blind detection capabilities of the adversary.
4.3.1 Scenario 1: The Passive Eavesdropper
For the ﬁrst attack scenario, Eve is a passive eavesdropper who tries to decode Alice’s
transmitted information symbols using the key she generates. Eve is equipped with the
same receiver as Bob and the only difference between them is their despreading codes.
To evaluate the security level of this attack, we ﬁrst consider use of the secrecy charac-
terization from [15], where the notion of secrecy outage probability is expressed as
Pout(Rs) = P
(
CB − CE < Rs
)
. (4.35)
where CB = log2(1+ SNR
o
B), CE = log2(1+ SNR
o
E).
The deﬁnition in (4.35) makes an assumption that the transmitter chooses a strategy
that leads to the main link communicating near capacity of the channel. In this way, while
SNRoB will allow for sufﬁcient information recovery at Bob’s node, SNR
o
E will be inadequate
in decoding information at Eve’s node. The parameter Rs is effectively a margin that when
chosen larger, increases the secrecy outage probability. An outage is said to occur when a
message is either unreliable for Bob to decode or insecure, i.e., there will be a possibility
that Eve decodes the message.
A known weakness of the secrecy characterization by (4.35) was ﬁrst discussed in [16].
It was noted that (4.35) does not distinguish between reliability and security. The secrecy
outage probability may be minimized for a given set of design parameters, but it is not
obvious from (4.35) whether this is due to an information leak or a reliability issue.
Accordingly, the following alternative deﬁnition of the secrecy outage probability was
proposed. The outage was deﬁned for when the difference between the target capacity and
Eve’s capacity is lower than Rs conditioned on the event that a message was transmitted.
In our model, we assume that message transmission always occurs since Alice and Bob are
operating independent of one another. The secrecy outage probability deﬁnition from [16]








RT = log2(1+ SNR
o
T) (4.37)
The deﬁnition of (4.36) states that an outage occurs when the SNR after despreading at
Eve’s node is within the margin of Rs from the target rate RT. The characterization in (4.36)
is useful from a practical standpoint in which Alice and Bob are operating independent of
one another. In such a case, Alice chooses a code that optimally works (i.e., error-free) for
target rate RT. This is different from the characterization in (4.35) where it is implied that if
SNRoB > SNR
o
T, then Alice chooses a different code to work at rate CB rather than the target
rate RT. It also follows that if Alice and Bob are communicating near target rate RT, an
appropriate deﬁnition for an information leak is the scenario in which CE is near RT rather
than the case where CE is close to CB.
With regards to the reliability of the main link, we note that a nice feature of our
artiﬁcial noise power allocation strategy is that it assures a target SNR is met so long as
the similarity between the keys generated by Alice and Bob is above a threshold. In other
words, it can be easily veriﬁed that if φ is obtained from (4.22), then P(SNRoB < SNRoT) is
equal to P(ρAB < ρmin).
We interpret at the secrecy outage characterization in (4.36) as an SNRdifference. Fig. 4.9
is shown to help the reader understand how this equation can be looked at as an SNR
difference Here, we take the equation CE = RT − Rs and plot the corresponding SNRs for
different values of Rs. The curves in Fig. 4.9 show the lines beyondwhich an outage occurs.
It is easy to verify that when Rs = 0, the secrecy outage probability reduces to a compar-
ison of the despreaded signal SNR’s at Bob and Eve’s nodes. When Rs is increased, the
requirement for a secrecy outage to occur is stricter since the required difference between
Bob and Eve’s channel capacity needs to be larger to meet a higher Rs.
4.3.2 Scenario 2: The Sophisticated Eavesdropper
In this attack scenario, Eve is given a signiﬁcant advantage in decoding the trans-
mitted data. In traditional artiﬁcial noise systems, e.g., [24, 25, 75–77], the assumption
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Figure 4.9. Plot of SNRoE vs. SNR
o
T in dB for selected values of Rs.
of a block-fading channel model limits the number of symbols that can be transmitted
conﬁdentially. With our formulation, we can transmit as many symbols as needed with a
given spreading code since the channel is not used to directly decrypt the information. The
consequence of encoding many symbols with the same spreading gain sequence is that a
sophisticated adversary may use a blind method to identify the information signal subspace
and subsequently use that knowledge to decode the communicated data.
Without artiﬁcial noise (i.e., φ = 1), secrecy against knowledgeable adversaries could
only exist for our system model if 1) Eve is at an SNR disadvantage compared to the main
link or 2) Alice only transmits one symbol per key, effectively applying a one-time pad to
the solution provided the key is generated at channel coherence time intervals. Both of
these assumptions are considerably strong to impose on the security of a wireless commu-
nication network. Here, we study the use of artiﬁcial noise as a way to increase throughput
of the secure communication system without assuming Eve to be at a disadvantage.
This attack scenario considers the situation where Alice transmits K symbols with the
same spreading code sequence and Eve seeks to estimate γA from her received signal. To
facilitate this study, we redeﬁne (4.15) as a matrix of concatenated received signal vectors
spread with the same key
Z =
[








where Z ∈ CN×K.
The columns of Z are a set of random vectors. Each of these vectors have the average
energy/power of P and the form of (4.15). There is a ﬁxed direction γA that carries data
symbols with the power φP. The rest of the power is in a random direction perpendicular
to γA. When the golden ratio - i.e., φ = 1/N - is used, the signal power is equally
distributed in all directions, including the direction γA. In this scenario, the signal space
will appear to bewhite with respect to all directions, including the data direction, making it
hard for an observer that wishes to ﬁnd γA. The situation will be different when φ = 1/N.
In such cases, the intruder can search for the direction that carries a different power than
the remaining directions.
The standard solution to ﬁnd the signal direction, i.e., the spreading gain vector γA,
when φ > 1/N, is the following.





2. Invoking the Rayleigh-Ritz Theorem [80], an estimate of γA is obtained by solving
the following maximization problem
γˆA = arg max‖γ‖=1
γHRZZγ (4.40)
For this procedure to give an accurate estimate, the number of signal samples (i.e., the
parameter K) should be sufﬁciently large. To give an idea of how how large K should
be to obtain a reasonable estimate of γA, we resort to some numerical results which are
presented in the next section.
4.3.3 Scenario 3: The Brute-Force Attacker
The two passive eavesdropper attacks discussed so far may not necessarily encompass
all possible attacks on the proposed system. Another feasible attack that a passive Evemay
use is a brute-force attack. In this attack, Eve takes her received signal vector and guesses
multiple different CIRs in an attempt to ﬁnd one which aligns closest to the information-
bearing signal space.
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The current key generation technique generates a key of length N using the frequency
response of a CIR measurement. If the key obtained by Alice and Bob has N′ mutual
information bits, then Eve needs to try up to 2N
′
CIRs to obtain a sufﬁcient estimate for
the spreading code that will remove the artiﬁcial noise. Note that the amount of CIRs Eve
would need to try depends on many things, including the signal-to-noise ratio associated
with both Alice and Bob’s spreading codes, the level of fault-tolerance that Alice builds in
her transmit signal, and the amount of randomness in the spreading code that Alice and
Bob generate.
Nevertheless, we will make an admittedly simple attempt to determine the computa-
tional complexity of the brute-force attack. Assume that Alice and Bob have probed the
wireless channel and generate spreading codes using the CIR. The spreading code can be
any vector that spans the complex-valued N dimensional space. In this dissertation, we
have simply adopted the channel’s frequency response as the spreading code. Instead of
using the key described in Chapter 2, we will assume that Alice and Bob have optimally
performed the key generation steps in such a way that the entropy rate of the resulting key
approaches the capacity of the wireless channel [81].
Using the method described in [51], we can obtain a rough number for the mutual
information in the key for the channel described in Section 2.7.1. Assuming an SNR of
20 dB, the mutual information of a key derived in this channel is 16 bits per channel
observation.
One last piece of information about the brute-force attack is regarding the fault-tolerance
property of our proposed secure transmission solution. Recall the discussion in Section
4.2.1 about our power allocation strategy in which Alice dedicates enough transmit power
to the information symbols to ensure a target SNR is met at Bob’s node as long as Alice and
Bob’s spreading codes are similar enough. The criteria used in describing the similarity
between Alice and Bob’s keys is quantiﬁed by ρAB. If ρAB is larger than ρmin, then Bob has
sufﬁcient SNR to decode Alice’s transmitted information. Essentially, ρmin describes the
amount of fault-tolerance in our communication system. As ρmin approaches 1, the secure
transmission system becomes less fault-tolerant.
For the brute-force attack, Eve guesses many different CIRs in an attempt to determine
one that will remove the artiﬁcial noise. If ρmin is chosen to be less than one, then Eve
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- similar to Bob - may be able to sufﬁciently remove artiﬁcial noise from the transmitted
codeword even if there are differences between Eve’s guessed key and the key Alice uses
to encrypt the message. In short, we have brieﬂy described a trade-off between fault-
tolerance and resilience to brute-force attacks. Alice may choose a low value for ρmin to
increase fault-tolerance, but this comes at a cost to the system’s resiliency against brute-
force attacks.
For the time being, the study of these details is left for future research. Instead, for
our simple brute-force attack model, we will make an assumption that no fault-tolerance
is built into the design - i.e., ρmin = 1. As per the discussion above, the spreading codes
contain approximately 16 bits per channel observation. Hence, Eve must to try up to 216
different CIRs in order to obtain a key that will remove the artiﬁcial noise in her received
signal vector. Note that the discussion is this section has also featured a worst-case adver-
sary who receives a noiseless signal vector from Alice.
Other methods of increasing resiliency against the brute-force attack may exist. For
example, another option for generating the key would be to take an approach where
Alice and Bob use multiple CIRs - sampled at coherence time intervals - to generate a
key that is more random than the key discussed in this dissertation. With such a key, the
computational complexity of the brute-force attack can be increased signiﬁcantly, making
the task of a brute force attack very demanding.
Another option for increasing computational complexity of the brute-force attack is
described by example as follows. Generate 8 independent keys, each containing approx-
imately 16 bits per channel observation. Next, take a length M message and scramble it
across 8 packets in such a way that it requires all 8 keys to extract the M length message.
This proposed idea would require 8 keys to obtain the message and therefore a brute-force
attacker would need to try up to 28×16 = 2128 keys.
In light of the intricacies associated with the brute-force attack, its detailed study re-
mains a problem for future research. In particular, we hope to achieve a better understand-
ing of the system model from an information-theoretic perspective. Using information-




The secure information transmission system that we propose adds artiﬁcial noise to the
traditional MC-SS as a means of enhancing physical-layer secrecy. At this point, we turn
our attention to validating the security of the proposed system and its expected perfor-
mance for the legitimate parties. We take N = 64 since it is the value of N that was used
in our spreading gain generation experiments as well as in our current implementation of
the FB-MC-SS system in [35].
We consider the limit of (4.20) as the SNR approaches inﬁnity. To simplify the discus-
sion here, we deﬁne SNRo in (4.20) as the despreaded signal SNR at Bob or Eve’s link.






(1− φ)(1− ρ) . (4.41)
It is trivial to see from (4.41) that if no artiﬁcial noise is used (i.e., φ = 1) and as
SNRiE → ∞, SNRoE will also increase to inﬁnity hence, no secrecy can be guaranteed regard-
less of how dissimilar Alice and Eve’s keys are. However, the addition of artiﬁcial noise
(i.e., when φ drops below one) provides an intriguing opportunity to securely transmit
conﬁdential information despite Eve having a signiﬁcant SNR advantage. Fig. 4.10 plots
(4.41) as a function of ρ for different values of φ.
In previous literature of artiﬁcial noise, where perfect CSI knowledge is assumed (i.e.,
ρAB = 1), high values of secrecy data rates can be achieved. However, as can be seen in
Fig. 4.10, if ρAB < 1, there is an exponential drop in SNRoB which can lead to a signiﬁcant
data reliability issue that gets exacerbated as artiﬁcial noise power is increased. This
highlights the main advantage of our artiﬁcial noise power allocation strategy in (4.22)
because it compensates for dissimilarity between Alice and Bob’s keys by strategically
introducing enough artiﬁcial noise such that a target rate is hit for a given ρmin that ﬁts the
criteria of (4.25).
In Fig. 4.10, it can also be seen that the limit of the despreaded signal’s SNR linearly
increases for {ρ | 0.2 < ρ < 0.8}. Moreover, (4.41) asymptotically approaches inﬁnity as
ρ → 1 and approaches zero as ρ → 0. In short, this trend is encouraging as it shows that
the introduction of artiﬁcial noise allows for nodes with the ”right” key to reliably decode
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Figure 4.10. Plot of the SNR after despreading - SNRoB - as link SNR approaches inﬁnity as
a function of ρ - a measure of similarity between Alice and Bob’s keys - for selected values
of φ.
the conﬁdential information while it hampers the decoding ability of users with different
keys, even when they have a considerable SNR advantage.
Next, we discuss the two scenarios of the ”passive eavesdropper” and ”sophisticated
eavesdropper”.
4.4.1 Scenario 1: The Passive Eavesdropper
Results from the simulation and experimentation channel models from Chapter 2 are
used to evaluate the key generation procedure in the context of the proposed secure in-
formation transmission system (note that the simulation channel model that we consider
here is the same as the one used to obtain results in Chapter 3). Two sets of keys will be
compared: the key generated before SPC and the key after applying SPC.
As discussed before, Eve follows the same steps as the main link in retrieving the
transmitted symbols sent by Alice. The effectiveness of this attack is evaluated using the
secrecy outage probability in (4.36). To ensure fair comparison between the two sets of
keys, ρmin is set according to the Training Method in Section 4.2.1.1 using δoT = 95% in (4.27).
In this way, 95% of the keys used will meet the target SNR after despreading, i.e.,
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P(SNRoB < SNRoT) = P(ρAB < ρmin)
= 5% . (4.42)
In this way, ρmin will be smaller for the keys that use SPC due to the slight decorrelation
effect that SPC has on the keys. In turn, this means less artiﬁcial noise can be added for
the keys obtained using SPC. Note that this formulation uses a-priori knowledge of ρAB to
determine ρmin, but that this is only used to ensure a fair comparison between the two sets
of keys. In practice, when a-priori knowledge is not available, ρmin should be set according
to the Target φmin strategy in 4.2.1.2.
The secure information transmission strategy that we use is one in which the target
rate is adapted according to SNRiB. For the adaptive target rate strategy, when SNR
i
B is too
low to meet a minimum target rate RTmin at φ = 1/N, the signal-to-artiﬁcial noise ratio is
calculated using (4.22). When the SNR at Bob’s receiver is high enough and thus, a large
amount of artiﬁcial noise power can be added (i.e., φ = φmin = 1/N), then the target rate
is increased. To ﬁnd the target rate in this scenario, we ﬁrst solve for SNRoT in (4.22) at





and then calculate RT using (4.37).
Fig. 4.11 shows evaluation of (4.36) at Rs = 1 for the passive eavesdropper attack for
simulation and experimentation results when using the adaptive target rate strategy. The
solid lines correspond to before SPC and the dashed lines correspond to after SPC. To
generate this ﬁgure, we assume a worst-case scenario where Eve has zero additive noise at
the receiver. The minimum target rate RTmin is set to 2 bits and is incremented according
to SNRiB. Additionally, a reliability of 95% at the main link is met for all SNR values in
Fig. 4.11. Note that to guarantee this reliability, the smallest value for SNRiB corresponds
to φ = 1 for the keys applied with SPC. Below the minimum value of SNRiB, there is not
enough transmit power at Alice’s node to allow for the minimum target rate of 2 bits.
To help the reader envision how the plot in Fig. 4.11 is generated, we also present
Fig. 4.12. Note that in this ﬁgure, the top plot corresponds to the key generated from
simulation and the bottom plot shows experimentally derived keys. Similar to Fig. 4.11,
solid and dashed lines correspond to keys generated before and after SPC, respectively. In
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Figure 4.11. Plot of the outage probability of secrecy evaluated at Rs = 1 as a function
of receiver SNR for the adaptive target rate strategy. The plot was obtained using the
ρAB and ρAE values from keys obtained through simulation and experiment. Dashed lines
show keys after SPC is applied. Black circles indicate the transition point at which the
target rate RT starts increasing and the golden ratio φ = 1/N is used.
Fig. 4.12, the dashed line at Rs = 1 indicates the point at which the outage probability for
4.11 is evaluated and we show the outage probability as a function of Rs for SNRiB = 0
dB and SNRiB = 10 dB. It can be seen that as the receiver SNR at Bob’s node is increased,
the capacity difference between the target rate and Eve’s channel capacity increased and
hence, the secrecy outage probability descreased. Furthermore, when a large amount of
artiﬁcial noise is used, the difference in secrecy outage probability is less between that
derived with and without SPC. This is because when a large amount of artiﬁcial noise can
be used, a slight mismatch in keys becomes sufﬁcient in confusing the eavesdropper.
Results from Fig. 4.11 indicate that the keys derived using SPC provide a signiﬁcant
boost to the security of the system. This is despite the fact that less artiﬁcial noise is being
broadcast at lower values of SNRs (i.e., the SNRiB values to the left of the black circles) as
a result of the way ρmin was obtained. It can also be seen that when SNRiB is high and
φ = 1/N, the probability of secrecy outage approaches a steady state. For the experiment
data set, the steady state value for the secrecy outage probability is ≈ 3% for keys that do
not use SPC, while keys applied with SPC are ≈ 0.1%. Therefore, the minimum amount
of security is better with SPC than without. Finally, we note that this transmit strategy
allows us to use high levels of artiﬁcial noise power (φ = 1/N), which is not only good in
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Figure 4.12. Plot of Pout(Rs) vs. Rs for keys generated through simulation (top) and
experiment (bottom). Solid and dashed curves coincide with keys generated with and
without SPC, respectively. Two values of SNRiB are shown so that the probability of a
secrecy outage can be compared for different levels of φ.
securing communications from a secrecy outage standpoint but also beneﬁcial in thwarting
the efforts of the more sophisticated adversary that we discuss next.
4.4.2 Scenario 2: The Sophisticated Eavesdropper
In this section, we show two different sets of results pertaining to the case wherein
multiple symbols are transmitted with the same spreading code sequence. First, we ex-
amine the transmitted sequence correlation matrix. Here, it is shown that the correlation
between elements of the transmitted signal is approximately zero when the golden ratio
of φ = 1/N is used, despite there being a high amount of correlation between elements of
the key. Next, we examine the amount of symbols that can be transmitted with one key as
artiﬁcial noise power is varied.
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First, consider the transmitted data vector xk from (4.8). It is shown in Appendix C that














where IN is an N × N identity matrix.
Fig. 4.13 plots the magnitude of the covariance matrix of an example γA coming from
our experimental data set for four distinct cases of φ. Here, it is interesting to see that
when φ = 1/N, the second term in (4.44) vanishes and hence, the covariance matrix of the
transmit sequence will be identity. The signiﬁcance of this ﬁnding is that when the golden
ratio is used, the signal direction γA will not be observable in the correlationmatrix E[xkxHk ]
and thus, any method that seeks to estimate γA by exploring the second order moments of
xk will be unsuccessful.
Next, we use numerical results to evaluate the effectiveness of the blind attack from
a sophisticated adversary as discussed in Section 4.3.2. The goal of this simulation is to
examine the number of symbols K that can be sent with a given key γA. To start, Alice
transmits K symbols with a given spreading code sequence obtained from the experimen-
tal data set. The information symbols are encoded with binary phase-shift keying (BPSK)
so that sk = ± σs and we assume the worst-case eavesdropper who has zero channel noise,
and thus, zk = xk.
Once Eve receives K symbols, she constructs thematrixZ as in (4.38). Next, the Rayleigh-
Ritz theorem (4.40) is applied to obtain a blind estimate of the spreading code sequence.
This process is run for increasing values of K from 4 to 256, and different choices of φ. To
evaluate the effectiveness of this attack, we calculate the similarity between γˆA and γA
using (4.21).
A set of plots is shown in Fig. 4.14 to enlighten the reader’s understanding of the blind
detection method we use. In this set of plots, the eigenvalues of Z are shown for different
values of φ and K. The N eigenvalues of Z are normalized to unit length. Since Z is a
correlation matrix, its eigenvalues are all real and non-negative [82].
In these plots, it can be seen that when K is large (and thus, Z is a rectangular matrix),
the information bearing subspace becomes easier to deduce from the artiﬁcial noise sub-
space for φ = 2/N and φ = 8/N. The reason for this is that the basis vectors that span
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φ = 1/N























































Figure 4.13. Plot of the magnitude of covariance matrix of xk for one γA from the experi-
ment data set for selected values of φ
the N dimensions in xk are estimated better for large K relative to N. Hence, the artiﬁcial
noise subspace which contains N − 1 basis vectors is better estimated for large K as is the
remainder subspace which carries the key. However, as it can be seen in Fig. 4.14, when
the golden ratio is used - i.e., φ = 1/N -, it is very difﬁcult to distinguish between the
artiﬁcial noise and information signal subspaces through an eigenvalue decomposition
because power is evenly distributed across all N dimensions even for large values of K
relative to N.
Fig. 4.15 plots the 99th percentile of ρAE, when γE is set equal to γˆA (the key found
through blind detection by Eve), as a function of K for varying values of φ. The 99th per-
centile shows the line where 99% of the time, ρAE remains below it. As observed for larger
values of φ, i.e., when the level of artiﬁcial noise is relatively low, the eavesdropper may
be able to obtain a reasonable estimate of γA within a relatively small number of observed
samples. However, as φ increases, it becomes more difﬁcult to estimate γA. For the golden
ratio of φ = 1/N, since E[xkxHk ] become the identity matrix, almost all the estimates of γA
remain nearly orthogonal to γA hence, guaranteeing secure communication.
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Figure 4.14. Plot of the eigenvalues of Z for chosen values of K and φ.
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Figure 4.15. Plot of the 99th percentile of ρAE as a function of K. Note that the 99th
percentile indicates that 99% of the time, ρAE is below the lines indicated in the graph.
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4.4.3 Comparison of keys
This section will be used to compare keys that have been proposed in this dissertation.
The comparison will consider the passive eavesdropper attack (i.e., Scenario 1 from Sec-
tion 4.3.1). This is because for the second attack scenario, it does not matter how the key is
obtained since the suggested blind detection algorithm merely observes the power of the
information-bearing subspace to ﬁnd the key. The reason that this comparison is given is
so we can determine whether the loss in similarity due to removing the strongest path of
the channel is worth the effort. Moreover, we also study the key that we proposed in one
of our previous reports in [42].
The comparison will make use of the secrecy characterization from (4.36) which can be
written and expanded as follows
Pout(Rs) = P
(









N−1 (1− φ)(1− ρmin)SNRiB + 1
)











Note that in (4.45), we have implicitly taken Eve’s receiver to be noiseless and the
expression from RT comes from the signal-to-artiﬁcial noise ratio equation from (4.22).
It can be seen from (4.45) that there are 6 total variables in this characterization: N, φ, ρmin,
SNRiB, ρAE, and Rs. As a way of simplifying the secrecy characterization for comparing
keys, we point out that only the golden ratio of φ = 1N is considered since it is found to be
optimal for the second attack scenario. Moreover, we will hold ρmin based on the same rule
used in Section 4.4.1 so that 95% reliability can be ensured for the communication between





(SNRiB + 1)(1− ρAE)





To summarize the discussion so far, the secrecy characterization we use simpliﬁes to
(4.46). This is effectively the rate difference - Rd - between the target rate RT and Eve’s
channel capacity CE evaluated at some SNRiB, with φ = 1/N, and SNR
i
E → ∞. The value
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of SNRiB that we use for the simulation data will be 10 dB which is the SNR value used to
obtain keys in the simulation.
To evaluate measurement data, we use an estimate of the instantaneous SNR between
Alice and Bob of each channel realization to get SNRiB. This means that the target rate RT
will be a function of SNRiB. This method allows us to interpret the secrecy characterization
in a way that is closer to how it would be implemented on a practical system.
To help the reader intuitively understand the results of the comparison, we plot, in
Fig. 4.16, the partial correlations of the keys between Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve for the three
following types of keys:
Key 1: The standard key generation approach used in this dissertation which follows
(2.13) (solid lines in Fig. 4.16).
Key 2: The same as Key 1 but generated after SPC is applied (dashed lines in Fig. 4.16).
Key 3: The key discussed in [42] from (2.14) in which the key is taken to be the sum-
mation of the phasors of the CIR with a shufﬂed version of the same signal. We only
consider SPC-augmented keys here for brevity (dotted lines in Fig. 4.16).
The partial correlations in Fig. 4.16 show thatKey 3 gives keyswhich aremost dissimilar
for the Alice-Eve pair. However, this key also signiﬁcantly decorrelates the Alice-Bob keys
as well. At this point, we are ready to compare the keys using the secrecy characterization
described in this section to quantify whether the loss in reciprocity is worth the gain in
secrecy of these keys.
Fig. 4.17 shows a pair of plots for the simulated channel and Fig. 4.18 shows the same
plots for the experimental data set. In the left-hand plot, the probability of a secrecy outage
in (4.46) is plotted versus Rs while in the right-hand plot, a CDF of the adversary’s channel
capacity CE is shown to help interpret the data in the left-hand plot.
The following interpretations can be made about Fig. 4.17 and Fig. 4.18 in comparing
the keys. 1) It can be seen from the right-hand plot that Key 3 succeeds the most in terms
of keeping information from Eve (i.e., keeping CE smallest). However, the decorrelation
between Alice and Bob’s keys for Key 3 limits the maximum target rate than can be used.
Hence, the reduction in key similarity betweenAlice and Bob due to phase shufﬂing results




























Figure 4.16. CDF of partial correlation between Alice and Bob’s keys ρAB and Alice and
Eve’s keys ρAE. The plot on the left side shows simulation results while the right-hand side
shows experimentation results. Note that these plots add the partial correlations of key 3,
but otherwise are the exact same as Fig. 3.6 and Fig. 3.8 for the left and right side plots,
respectively. In these plots, key 1 is represented with solid lines, key 2 with dashed lines,
and key 3 with dotted lines.
Although the largest target data rate RT can be achieved with Key 1 - due mostly to the
fact that no additional processing is applied to this key - the downfall of this key is that
Eve’s keys are too similar to those shared between the main link. 3) Key 2 provides the best
balance between Key 1 and Key 3. It can be seen that the probability of a secrecy outage is
lowest for larger values of Rs when Key 2 is used. Thus, the slight reduction in similarity
due to removal of the strongest path is outweighed by the decorrelation that SPC adds to
Eve’s keys.
Interpretation of the experimental data from Fig. 4.18 is a bit more complicated. Here,
the probability of secrecy outage overlaps at different points for the three keys. Key 3 still
exhibits the same problem observed in the simulation data - i.e., the largest rate that can
be achieved by this key when a large amount of artiﬁcial noise is used is very limited.
For the other keys, the probability of secrecy outage is higher for Key 1 until Rs ∼ 3, after
which it is higher for Key 2. This period of transition is largely attributed to the fact that
Key 1 can support a higher RT than Key 2. Although the probability of secrecy outage is
smaller for large Rs with Key 1, the adversary’s capacity CE is signiﬁcantly higher for Key
1 than any other key. Additionally, the probability of secrecy outage with Key 1 is ∼ 10%
at Rs = 0, suggesting that 10% of the generated keys will result in an information leak to
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Figure 4.17. Plot of the probability of secrecy outage vs. Rs (Left) and a plot of the CDF of
CE (Right) using the simulated channel data.
Eve. Therefore, we can conclude that since Key 1 allows for too great of a possibility of an
information leak and since Key 3 signiﬁcantly hinders the communication of the main link,
Key 2 is the preferred key because it simultaneously allows for a relatively high target rate
for the legitimate parties while ensuring a very low probability of information leaked to
Eve’s node.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter completes the study of the proposed secure information transmission
system discussed throughout this dissertation. A large part of this chapter was devoted to
the concept of artiﬁcial noise and its use for spread spectrum communications. Two types
of attacks were studied on the system and both considered a noiseless adversary. In the
ﬁrst attack, a passive eavesdropping adversary with the same receiver as the legitimate
users was considered. It was shown that this adversary can be thwarted when Alice and
Bob are not SNR constrained and thus, can use a large amount of artiﬁcial noise. For the
second attack, we considered a more sophisticated Eve with signiﬁcant blind detection
capabilities. Here, it was found that when Eve studies the second-order moments of
the transmitted signal, she cannot determine the information-bearing subspace when the
golden signal-to-artiﬁcial noise ratio of φ = 1/N is used. Finally, in the last segment of
this chapter, it was shown that keys derived using SPC gave the best performance results
in context of the proposed secure information design.
94

































Figure 4.18. Plot of the probability of secrecy outage vs. Rs (Left) and a plot of the CDF of
CE (Right) using over the air measurement data.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
5.1 Conclusion
In this dissertation, we proposed and studied a secret-key enabled secure information
transmission system for spread spectrum communication. We presented amethod through
which two asynchronous radios can exchange a set of spreading codes through the use
of the reciprocal wireless channel. The key itself is shown to have been made stronger
through the use of a method that we named SPC (Strongest Path Cancellation). We val-
idated our approach through both simulation and experimentation and showed that the
use of SPC greatly aids our proposed secure information transmission solution.
The secure information transmission system proposed in this dissertation introduced
the concept of artiﬁcial noise to multicarrier spread spectrum systems as a means of en-
hancing the physical-layer security in wide band communications. The solutionwas tested
against both a passive eavesdropper who follows the same procedure of Alice and Bob as
well as a more sophisticated adversary who seeks to blindly detect the key transmitted
by Alice. In the ﬁrst situation, it was shown that despite SPC introducing a slight decor-
relation between keys of Alice and Bob, the probability of a secrecy outage remains in
favor of the key generated using SPC. For the more sophisticated adversary, we made
the following observation. When Alice and Bob have enough SNR to take advantage of,
by adding sufﬁcient artiﬁcial noise, they will be able to communicate many information
symbols securely.
5.2 Future Work
In this dissertation, we have proposed a practical technique for secure information
transmission using the reciprocal wireless channel. In fact, the secure information trans-
mission step should only require a slight modiﬁcation at the physical-layer transmitter to
add artiﬁcial noise. Although the channel probing protocol has been successfully imple-
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mented, the validation of the secure information transmission setup on an MC-SS plat-
form is something to be considered for future research. Moreover, with our developed
FB-MC-SS technique, the receiver needs to properly detect a packet, equalize the channel,
correct timing and frequency offsets, etc. Therefore, something that needs to be examined
in the future is how the addition of artiﬁcial noise interacts with deﬁciencies associated
with the physical-layer. An interesting demo resulting from this future development could
show how an eavesdropper - even with a signiﬁcant SNR advantage - cannot decode the
conﬁdential information of Alice.
One assumption that we make in the adversary model in Section 1.4 is the assumption
of a clean channel so that channel reciprocity can be maintained. This assumption is
common for most, if not all, literature on physical-layer security solutions which make
use of reciprocity of the wireless channel. The assumption of a clean channel, however,
contradicts with the environment in which spread spectrum technology is typically asso-
ciated with - e.g., a harsh interference and noise environment. Therefore, a possible area
for future research would be in the development of a dynamic spectrum access technology
which could allow for two nodes to agree on a common clean channel with which to
generate a key from. Such a technologywould not be too dissimilar from the one discussed
by Wasden et al. in [29, 34]. Furthermore, it goes without saying that such a system
would be beneﬁcial to those in the ﬁeld of physical-layer security since interference and
active adversaries are often assumed to be turned off. Along with this idea, the ability to
estimate the channel at variable bandwidths could also be useful. The idea here is that
the bandwidth of the channel estimate could depend on the level of use and interference
within the band.
In physical-layer security, the wireless channel must be probed using a given transmit
sequence. In the ﬁeld of physical-layer key generation and secure information transmission,
many works, including the famous [21, 83], transmit a set of tones across different fre-
quencies as a method to probe the channel. In these cases, masquerading attacks can
occur if Alice transmits a tone to Bob and Eve transmits the same sequence back to Alice.
Since the tones don’t have a signature through which Alice can properly associate with
a legitimate user, masquerading attacks can easily occur and are a weakness of these
systems. To solve this problem, we have noted that the Zadoff-Chu sequence allows for a
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unique signature to be attached to the transmit sequence. The concept here is that Alice
can identify Bob’s channel probe using fairly simple signal processing techniques with the
aid of the signature. This is an area which has largely remained outside the scope of this
dissertation as is true for other works within the literature, but is recommended for further
development.
Regarding the secure information transmission system in Chapter 4, we note the fol-
lowing points about the sophisticated eavesdropper attack examined in Section 4.3. First,
we recognize that BPSK is a non-ideal encoding scheme to use since the information signal
subspace is strictly ±1 when using BPSK. Second, the blind detection algorithm used
in this scenario may be optimal for situations where φ > 1/N due to the Rayleigh-Ritz
theorem (4.40). However, when φ = 1/N, there may exist a better blind detection method.
Future research should take these two considerations into account. Obtaining analytic
expressions to determine the exact amount of symbols which can be sent across the channel
in an information-theoretic manner would be the ﬁrst step of this research. Another step
that should follow this research would be to characterize the use of a signiﬁcant amount
of artiﬁcial noise (i.e., when φ = 1/N) as a way to mask the randomness (or lack thereof)
of the key.
Finally, we recommend a comparative study on the use of artiﬁcial noise in different
types of SS systems. In particular, the study would consider how artiﬁcial noise would
impact the the standard transceivers of DS-SS and MC-SS systems. When CSI information
is imperfect, how does each SS system react to differences in spreading codes with artiﬁcial
noise? Another important matter which should be investigated in this line of research is
whether the use of a single-tap equalizer in MC-SS gives a competitive advantage over
DS-SS.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF SNR AFTER DESPREADING
The SNR after despreading with artiﬁcial noise is derived in this section. To start, recall
that Bob’s received signal after despreading is
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= |γHB γA|2σ2s (A.3)
For the denominator, we know that the noise and artiﬁcial noise are uncorrelated and
consequently, the variance of the two terms can be separated. Next, using the expression
of artiﬁcial noise in (4.9),
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= |γHB γA|2σ2w . (A.8)
Combining (A.5), (A.6), (A.7), and (A.8), we get
Var[γHB v] = σ
2
w(1− |γHB γA|2) (A.9)





where σ2η is the total noise power across the occupied bandwidth. Finally, by combining
(A.3), (A.9), and (A.10), and recalling that





we get the expression
SNRoB =
|γHB γA|2σ2s
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APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF PROBABILITY THAT THE
SNR AFTER DESPREADING MEETS
TARGET SNR
In this section, it is shown that if Alice follows the artiﬁcial noise power allocation
strategy discussed in Section 4.2.1, the probability that the target SNR SNRoT is met so long
as the similarity between Alice and Bob’s keys are above a threshold ρmin. Note that this
section also serves as a veriﬁcation of the result in (4.22).
We start from the ﬁnal result from (4.24) and solve in reverse order i.e.,
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Next, the parameter φ and (1− φ) can be written as
φ =
N
N−1 (1− ρmin)SNRiB + 1
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Substitution of (B.4) and (B.5) into (B.3) gives
P
(
N(1− ρmin)SNRiB + (N − 1)ρAB
N − 1 + > . . . (B.6)
(1− ρAB)(NρminSNRiB − SNRoT) + SNRoT(1− ρmin) + (N − 1)ρmin
N − 1 +
)
. (B.7)















which can be simpliﬁed to give the ﬁnal result.
P(ρAB > ρmin) = P(SNRoB > SNRoT) . (B.9)
APPENDIX C
DERIVATION OF COVARIANCE MATRIX OF
TRANSMIT SEQUENCE
The covariance matrix of the transmit signal xk is evaluated in this section. We start by
using the deﬁnition of the transmit signal equation from (4.8) to obtain
E[xkxHk ] = E[(γAsk + vk)(γAsk + vk)
H] (C.1)
















A ] = 0 (C.3)
E[vkvHk ] = E[(wk − γAγHAwk)(wk − γAγHAwk)H] (C.4)
where (C.3) follows from the assumption that artiﬁcial noise is uncorrelated to the infor-
mation symbols sk. There are four terms in (C.4) and they can be evaluated as follows
E[wkwHk ] = σ
2
wIN (C.5)
E[−wkwHk γAγHA ] = −σ2wγAγHA (C.6)
E[−γAγHAwkwHk ] = −σ2wγAγHA (C.7)




where in writing (C.5), we have recalled the deﬁnition of σ2w from (4.11). Also, the simpli-
ﬁcation in C.8 comes from the fact that the key is normalized to unit length, i.e., ‖γA‖ = 1.
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